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6.1 Introduction
In early United States history, tariffs and excise taxes were the major
sources of government revenue. Because of constitutional constraints on
direct taxation at the federal level, an income tax could not be enacted
until the Sixteenth Amendment was passed in 1913. Since that time the
personal income tax has become the single most important tax, growing
to more than 35 percent of total revenue and to more than 45 percent of
federal revenue (see the annual Economic Report of the President).
The importance of the corporate income tax also grew in the first part
of this century, but the past thirty years have seen a decline in its share of
federal revenue, from about 25 percent to 15 percent. Major policy shifts
have reduced the corporate tax by introducing investment tax credits and
by speeding up allowances for depreciation. Under the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, as amended by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, corporate revenues are expected to fall still further.
The decline in corporate revenues has, however, been more than offset
by the increase in social insurance taxes. From 18 percent of federal
revenues in 1960, payroll taxes increased by one percentage point per
year before leveling off at 33 percent in 1975. Finally, the proportions
above leave only about seven percentage points for the recent share of
other federal sources, including excise taxes. Thus revenue sources have
experienced a major reversal in the seventy years since 1913.
Trends in revenue between 1960 and 1979 are shown in table 6.1 (which
may be compared with the corresponding tables in the other country
chapters). The rising shares of personal and payroll taxes are evident in
this table, as are the falling shares of corporate and excise taxes. As a
proportion of GDP, taxes grew from about 7 percent to 24 percent over
the first half of this century. The bottom of table 6.1 shows that this
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Table 6.1 Sources of Tax Revenue, United States
Revenue Source
Taxes on personal incomes
Federal income tax
State and local income tax
Capital gains (federal, state,
and local)











Taxes on goods and services
General sales tax
Alcohol (federal, state, and local)
Tobacco (federal, state, and local)
Motor fuels (state and local)
Other (federal, state, and local)
Total receipts
Gross domestic product ($ billion)
























































































Source: Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1980 (Paris, 1981).
"Employee shares exactly match employer shares for Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and
Health Insurance (OASDHI), but only employers pay for unemployment insurance and
workmen's compensation.
growth has continued since 1950, although at a slower rate, to about 30
percent of GDP in 1979.
One trend not evident in table 6.1 is the growth of state and local tax
revenues in the 1960s. These revenues were 8.6 percent of GDP in 1960
and just over 11 percent in both 1970 and 1980 (see Economic Report of
the President). When this revenue is coupled with grants from the federal
government, it is clear that the funds available to subfederal governments
have increased dramatically. Federal grants to the state and local govern-
ments were 1.3 percent of GDP in 1960, 2.5 percent in 1970, and 3.3
percent in 1980. The revenues retained at the federal level have thus
declined as a percentage of GDP.
Within the United States, different levels of government use a variety
of separate instruments for the taxation of income from capital. Income195 Introduction
in the corporate sector is subject to the federal corporate income tax,
state corporate income or franchise taxes, local property taxes, and the
personal income tax of the ultimate recipients. Federal corporate and
personal income taxes are not integrated, though there is a small dividend
deduction of up to $100 at the personal level ($200 for joint returns).
Though there has been considerable discussion of integration in academic
circles,
1 actual policy proposals that would affect taxation of capital
income tend to involve changes in accelerated depreciation, investment
tax credit rates, interest exemptions, or the various forms of savings
deductions for individual retirement accounts.
Aside from being a major source of revenue in the United States, the
corporate tax system has been used for stabilization and as an incentive.
The rate of tax, the rate of investment tax credit, and the allowances for
depreciation have all been changed in response to macroeconomic condi-
tions. Depreciation for tax purposes, known as "capital consumption
allowance" in the United States, is accelerated to a different degree for
each asset. Accelerated allowances have been used to provide incentives
for investment in particular kinds of assets such as pollution-control
equipment and low-cost housing.
Another concern has been the effect of inflation on the taxation of
income from capital. Because depreciation is based on historical cost,
inflation reduces the real value of nominal depreciation deductions in
later years. This problem was not important in the 1950s and 1960s when
inflation was running at about 2 percent per year, but from 1970 to 1980
the deflator for gross private domestic product increased at an average
annual rate of 6.77 percent. This inflation rate averages consumption and
investment goods, and it is the measure used for expected inflation in this
chapter. Because of inflation, there have been frequent proposals to
shorten asset lives for tax purposes. The recently enacted Accelerated
Cost Recovery System (ACRS) not only shortens lives but simplifies
administration by aggregating diverse assets into only a few categories of
service lives. Other discussion has centered on reestimation of economic
service lives (e.g., Hulten and Wykoff 1981) and indexing depreciation
for inflation (e.g., Auerbach and Jorgenson 1980).
The fifty states have different systems for taxing income in the corpo-
rate sector. Thousands of local jurisdictions impose further taxes on
commercial and industrial property, each with its own statutory rate and
its own ratio of assessed value to market value. Capital income taxation is
further complicated at the individual level, where taxes depend on con-
siderations such as the proportion of dividend recipients with less than
$100 of dividends, the dividend/retention policies of firms, the determi-
1. Charles McLure (1979) provides a comprehensive discussion of integration proposals
in the United States, and Fullerton et al. (1981) provide some estimates of welfare effects
attributable to several such proposals.196 The United States
nants of tax-exempt status, the ceilings on individual retirement ac-
counts, and the interaction of inflation with the nominal brackets of a
graduated personal tax system.
Because of the variations of personal tax rates among income recip-
ients, property tax rates among state and local jurisdictions, depreciation
lives among different assets, and means of finance among different indus-
tries, an overall evaluation of United States effective marginal tax rates is
a particularly useful but difficult exercise.
The outline for this chapter is the same as that of the other country
chapters in this study: section 6.2.1 describes salient features of the
personal income tax in the United States, including both federal and state
tax provisions. While the 1980 law is used for comparison with other
countries, the two new tax laws of 1981 and 1982 are also described and
evaluated. Section 6.2.2 describes federal and state income tax provi-
sions, but it defers discussion of depreciation allowances to section 6.2.3
and discussion of investment tax credits to section 6.2.5. Economic
depreciation appears in section 6.2.4, and property taxes are described in
section 6.2.6. Effective personal tax rates for our three ownership cate-
gories are provided in sections 6.2.8, 6.2.9, and 6.2.10. The various parts
of section 6.3 provide information on the amount of investment flowing
from each owner to each location, and the parts of section 6.4 provide
final estimates of the total effective marginal tax rates in the United
States.
6.2 The Tax System
6.2.1 The Personal Income Tax
Because personal taxes started primarily as taxes on income, and
because departures from comprehensive income taxation have tended to
involve various types of income from capital, many individuals view these
departures as loopholes for wealthy taxpayers that significantly reduce
the progressivity of the overall tax system. For example, capital gains
taxation has been a more prominent feature in the United States than in
the other three countries in this study, yet many view as a loophole the
fact that the tax base includes only 40 percent of long-term capital gains
(those resulting from assets held more than twelve months). Some recent
proposals would increase this partial exclusion, while others would tax all
capital gains. Still other proposals would broaden the tax base in other
ways and replace the graduated rate structure with a flat rate of tax that is
relatively low. On the other hand, the 40 percent inclusion refers to
nominal realized long-term capital gains, an amount that might be greater
than or less than real accrued capital gains, depending on the rate of
inflation and on the asset.197 The Tax System
Other departures from comprehensive income taxation include the
nontaxation of state and local bond interest, the imputed rents from
owner-occupied homes, and the income from saving through pension
funds and life insurance. As the untaxed proportion of investment in-
come has increased, and as discussion about the switch to a consumption-
based tax has continued, fewer of these features have come to be viewed
as loopholes. Yet, as pointed out by Bradford (1980) and others, having
half of all assets on a consumption-tax basis is not like being halfway
between an income tax and a consumption tax. Because of the dispersion
of tax rates on different investments, this hybrid system has many dis-
advantages not associated with either pure extreme.
Table 6.2 documents some of the changes in the personal income tax
base since 1950. The National Income and Product Accounts' definition
of personal income is the starting point in the first row of table 6.2. This
definition is equivalent to an economic definition of income minus unreal-
ized capital gains and minus the imputed rents of owner-occupied homes.
The basic income concept for personal tax purposes in the United States
is called adjusted gross income (AGI). It can be obtained from personal
income by subtracting 60 percent of realized long-term capital gains, all
of interest from state and local bonds, transfer receipts, pension contribu-
tions of employers, moving expenses, alimony, and the income from
saving through life insurance. The second row of table 6.2 reveals that
these exclusions have increased steadily as a fraction of personal income
since 1950.
Table 6.2 also reveals that the illegally unreported fraction of income
diminished from 1950 to 1970, before turning back up again. The fraction
of personal income on taxable returns increased from 70 percent in 1950
to 76 percent in 1970, and it fell back to 72 percent by 1978.
"Taxable income" in the United States refers to reported AGI after
personal deductions and exemptions. Personal deductions can include
charitable contributions, interest paid, state and local taxes, medical
Table 6.2 Taxable Income as a Percentage of Personal Income
Total personal income
Adjusted gross income (AGI)
Reported AGI
Reported AGI on taxable returns

























Source: Own calculations from data in the Survey of Current Business (Commerce Depart-
ment) and Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns (Treasury Department). See
Pechman (1977) or Steurle and Hartzmark (1981) for further tables.
Note: Adjusted gross income is the basic accounting measure for tax purposes in the United
States and is further described in the text.198 The United States
expenses above 3 percent of AGI, and some casualty losses. Each tax-
payer can elect to "itemize" these deductions—that is, to list all deduc-
tions, add them up, and subtract the total from AGI before paying tax.
As an alternative, taxpayers can take the "standard deduction" of $2,300
(or $3,400 for joint returns), also called the zero-bracket amount. The
personal exemption is $1,000 per taxpayer, spouse, and each dependent.
As shown in table 6.2, these deductions and exemptions made up over 30
percent of personal income in 1950, fell gradually to 26 percent in 1970,
but then fell dramatically to only 12.4 percent in 1978. Inflation has
eroded the real value of these nominal amounts in spite of occasional
legislative increases, and as a result the taxable portion of personal
income has risen from 37 to 60 percent since 1950.
The taxable portion of income in the United States is subject to the
federal rate schedules of table 6.3 for joint returns. To show the zero-
bracket amount, "income" in this table is defined as AGI less exemptions
and less any itemized deductions over $3,400. The schedules for single
and married taxpayers differ in such a way that a couple with sufficiently
unequal incomes can reduce their total taxes by being married, while a
couple with similar incomes would suffer a tax penalty by being married.
Although marginal rates ranged from 14 percent to 70 percent in 1980,















































































Source: Revenue Act of 1978, Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, and Steurle and
Hartzmark (1981).199 The Tax System
table 6.3 shows that three-fourths of all returns were taxed at a 24 percent
marginal rate or less.
Tax rates under the Economic Recovery Tax Act are also shown in
table 6.3. This 1981 law specifies a phased reduction of personal tax rates
over three years starting with 1981. The top bracket is reduced from 70
percent to 50 percent, and if there were no inflation other rates would be
reduced by 23 percent. Much of this reduction just offsets the effects of
inflation since the last adjustment in 1978, however, and further inflation
is expected to erode the value of these tax cuts by the time they take full
effect in 1984. This law specifies automatic inflation adjustments to the
income brackets and exemptions, starting in 1985.
Low-income taxpayers with dependents can qualify for the "earned
income credit." This credit is equal to 10 percent of earned income up to
$5,000, and it is reduced thereafter to the point where no credit is
received with $10,000 of earned income. However, this credit is unusual
in that it is refundable, which means that the government will send a
check to the household if the credit exceeds their normal tax liability. A
joint return with two dependents receives a credit in excess of tax liability
up to an AGI of $8,483. Thus, the United States system includes a type of
negative income tax. At the other end of the spectrum, earned income in
1980 was ostensibly subject to a maximum tax of 50 percent.
2
For all qualified private retirement plans, both employee and employer
contributions are deductible, while all benefits are taxable. If the indi-
vidual's marginal tax rate does not change upon retirement, then this
treatment is equivalent to that of a consumption tax.
3 Employees not
covered by a pension plan in 1980 could deduct savings of 15 percent of
earned income up to a $1,500 maximum ($1,750 for joint returns)
through an individual retirement account (IRA). The 1981 Tax Act
removed the percentage limitation and increased the maximum to $2,000
($2,250 for joint returns). It also made IRAs available to those already
covered by pension plans of their employers. Self-employed persons
could deduct savings of 15 percent of earned income up to $7,500 under a
Keogh retirement plan, increased to $15,000 by the new law.
Social security taxes and subsequent benefits could be viewed as
another savings vehicle, an alternative to the various retirement savings
vehicles just described. Because these social security payments are man-
2. For an exposition of how earned income could be effectively taxed at more than 50
percent at the margin, see Lindsey (1981). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
reduced all marginal rates to a maximum of 50 percent.
3. See chapter 2. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (U.S. Department of the Treasury
1977) describes a consumption tax that operates like a comprehensive income tax but allows
deductions for savings through "qualified accounts." Since income minus savings leaves
only consumption in the tax base, a normal graduated schedule can be applied to it.
Qualified retirement plans operate in this manner, except that they have contribution
ceilings and withdrawal constraints.200 The United States
datory, however, they are not included in our calculations of the effective
tax on a marginal increase of savings. To the degree that social security is
an actuarially fair way to save, this vehicle would receive favored status
relative to an income tax or even a consumption tax. While employee
contributions are taxable, the employer contributions and all social secur-
ity benefits go tax free.
Business income of unincorporated enterprises is taxed under the
personal tax system. Depreciation allowances are the same as those
described in section 6.2.3 for corporations, and investment tax credits are
the same as those described in section 6.2.5 for corporations.
Because of the various exclusions and deductions, tax revenue from
high-income individuals can sometimes be small. Income from capital is
more readily sheltered than income from labor, particularly through
exclusion of imputed rents and 60 percent of long-term capital gains. To
take another example, a combination of debt finance and accelerated
depreciation means that an investor can often claim first-year allowances
greater than the initial capital investment. These considerations have led
to two kinds of provisions. First, Congress has passed rules that prevent
the investor from taking depreciation allowances beyond the amount of
the investment for which he is at risk. That is, the investor cannot use
nonrecourse debt and still qualify for fully accelerated allowances.
Second, Congress passed "minimum tax" provisions in 1969, strength-
ened them in 1976, and weakened them again in 1978. These provisions
operate as a floor to tax liability, designed to ensure that at least some tax
is paid at high income levels. A 15 percent rate is applied to "preference
income," defined as the excluded 60 percent of long-term gains, itemized
deductions that are over 60 percent of AGI, and parts of depletion
deductions, intangible drilling costs, and accelerated depreciation. State
and local interest is not included here as a preference income item.
Finally, at the federal level, we should mention the averaging provi-
sions that are designed to help avoid the payment of extra tax that is due
solely to the interaction of a volatile income stream and a graduated tax
system. However, income must exceed the average of the previous four
years by at least one-third, this excess must be more than $3,000, and no
allowance is made for falling incomes.
Of the forty-one states with personal income taxes, thirty-two make
use of the AGI concept from the federal tax calculations. States differ
with respect to exemptions and deductions and with respect to the appli-
cable rate structure. Most state systems have graduated rates, and several
have top marginal rates as high as 11 percent. Only Alaska, Delaware,
Iowa, and New York have top marginal rates above 11 percent. Also,
state taxes paid are deductible at the federal level if the taxpayer itemizes
deductions.201 The Tax System
Several local governments collect personal income taxes. New York
City and Washington, D.C., obtain more than 20 percent of their rev-
enues from this source, while Philadelphia gets a full half. In total,
however, local income taxes collected only $3.75 billion in 1977. When
compared with $25.5 billion at the state level and $156.7 billion at the
federal level, this $3.75 billion of local tax can be ignored for present
purposes.
Effective marginal tax rates at the household level are estimated using
the tax simulation (TAXSIM) model of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER). This model is described in Feldstein and Frisch (1977)
and in Feenberg and Rosen (1983). The data base for this model includes
25,000 tax return records from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for
each year, TAXSIM has information not only on adjusted gross income, but
also on wages, dividends, interest, capital gains, other types of income,
and on various tax deductions taken for each return in the sample. The
state of residence is also available for each return. The federal tax law and
each of the fifty states' tax laws are specifically programmed into the
model. To calculate the effective marginal tax rate on a given type of
income, such as interest income, the TAXSIM model raises all individuals'
receipts of that income type by 1 percent, recalculates their tax liabilities,
and sums the additional tax to be paid. It is thus a weighted-average
marginal tax rate, where the weights are the shares for the type of income
under consideration.
To obtain federal rates, the TAXSIM model need not account for the
deductibility of any additional state taxes. For combined state and federal
tax rates, however, there is a simultaneous deductibility in states that
allow a deduction for federal taxes. These deductions are simulated for
the same tax year, though actual federal (state) practice allows a deduc-
tion for one year's state (federal) taxes in the following tax year. Deduc-
tions are allowed only for those who itemize.
Because tax law does not require the separate specification of corpo-
rate bond interest and bank deposit interest, the tax-return data show
only total interest receipts. Thus we can calculate an overall marginal tax
rate on interest income but not a separate weighted-average marginal tax
rate on corporate interest alone. The most recent data available are for
1977, a problem that is discussed further below.
If a marginal dollar of wage income were distributed in proportion to
all wage income, the simulated extra tax would be about 27 cents at the
federal level, 5 cents on average at the state level, and about 32 cents
overall. Similar overall weighted-average marginal tax rates for dividend
and interest incomes are 47.5 percent and 32.5 percent, respectively.
These estimates reflect the fact that dividends are more highly concen-
trated in high income brackets than are taxable interest receipts.202 The United States
Finally, data in TAXSIM can be used to estimate the elasticity of personal
income taxes to changes in the tax base. This "liability" measure of
progressivity is equal to one for proportional taxes and is larger than one
for progressive taxes. For the United States personal income tax, the
estimated elasticity is 1.66, including state and federal taxes.
4 This esti-
mate is similar to the 1.76 estimate found by Ott and Dittrich (1981).
6.2.2 The Corporate Tax System
The federal corporate income tax started in 1913 at a rate of 1 percent.
The marginal rate varied around 12 percent from 1918 to 1935. The
United States instituted a surcharge on retained earnings in 1936 and
1937 and thus experimented briefly with a form of corporate integration.
It reverted to a classical system, however, and the top rate varied around
40 percent until 1945. The top marginal rate after 1946 has varied around
50 percent, as shown in table 6.4.
In 1980 the federal corporate tax had a graduated rate structure, with
percentage rates of 17, 20, 30, and 40 applied to four brackets of $25,000
each. The 1981 law reduces the first two brackets' rates to 15 and 18
percent, respectively. Above $100,000 of taxable income under both
laws, corporations pay a flat 46 percent marginal tax rate.
For the federal part of T, the statutory corporate rate, the relevant
concept is the additional tax on profits resulting from a dollar of marginal
investment allocated in proportion to existing capital. While most cor-
porations do not reach the top marginal rate of 0.46, the great bulk of
corporate capital is held by firms that do.
5 Thus we can safely ignore
investment in firms with less than $100,000 of profits and take 0.46 as the
federal part of T.
The corporate income tax applies to all corporate profits net of depre-
ciation, interest payments, and other expenses, whether those profits are
retained or distributed. The payment of dividends does not affect the
corporate tax as it does in Germany or the United Kingdom. Thus, since
1938, the United States corporate tax is a classical system. If the corpora-
tion retains another dollar, it gives up a dollar of dividends that are gross
of the personal income tax. Thus 1.0 is the value for 0, the opportunity
cost of retained earnings in terms of gross dividends.
The corporation may deduct all dividends it receives from subsidiaries
and 85 percent of dividends from other corporations. Long-term capital
gains are fully taxed under both the old law and the new law, but at a
reduced rate of 0.28 instead of 0.46. Capital losses may be used only to
offset capital gains within the previous three or following five years. On
the other hand, net operating losses may be carried back for three years
or forward for seven. The 1981 Tax Act extends this carryover to fifteen
years.
4. I am grateful to Daniel Feenberg, who performed all TAXSIM calculations.































Source: Facts and Figures on Government Finance, Tax Foundation, 1981.
aIn 1968 and 1969 the basic rate was 48 percent, but there were surcharges of 10 percent and
2.5 percent, respectively, applied to tax liabilities.
Before 1969, oil and gas producers could deduct 27.5 percent of gross
receipts as an allowance for the depletion of reserves. Total depletion was
not limited to the cost of the asset. Since exploration and drilling costs
were immediately expensed, however, these depletion allowances were
generally recognized as a preferential treatment. In 1969 these allow-
ances were reduced to 22 percent, and in 1975 they were cut to 15 percent
for small producers and eliminated for large producers.
Several other features of the federal tax code are worth mentioning at
this point. First, immediate expensing is allowed for intangible invest-
ments such as advertising and R&D. Since neither corporate "goodwill"
nor research and development capital is considered an asset in this study,
this tax break is ignored. Second, certain tax credits are allowed for the
hiring of new employees. Third, earnings of foreign subsidiaries are taxed
only upon repatriation to the United States parent corporation. A credit
on United States taxes is allowed for any foreign taxes already paid on
those earnings. Finally, a domestic international sales corporation
(DISC) can be organized to handle export business of a United States
corporation. Part of the DISC earnings are also untaxed until returned to
the parent corporation.
With respect to subfederal corporate income taxes, forty-five states
and the District of Columbia levy rates varying from 2 percent to 12
percent. Most systems define corporate income in a manner similar to the
federal system, but adjustments vary from state to state. Most also have a
graduated structure. A significant problem arises, however, in determin-
ing what portion of the corporation's total profits were generated in the
state. Most corporate income is apportioned among states through the
use of a formula based on the proportion of the corporation's total
property located in the state, the proportion of total wages paid in the
state, and the proportion of the corporation's sales in the state. Each state
can choose its own formula. An interesting result of this procedure is that
the sum of a corporation's tax base across the taxing states can exceed its
total profits, if each state chooses a formula that is advantageous to its204 The United States
own base. Many states use the "Massachusetts formula," giving equal
weight to each of the three factors mentioned above.
6
For our marginal statutory tax rate T, we would like to include a
weighted average of state marginal tax rates and account for deductibility
at the federal level. The top marginal rate in each state is available in
Facts and Figures on Government Finance (Tax Foundation 1981), but
the choice of weights is more difficult. A 1 percent increase in all corpo-
rate capital holdings would be distributed among the states in proportion
to existing capital holdings, but state taxes on the income would also
depend on where those corporations paid wages and made sales. Since
states adopt different apportionment formulas, a "correct" set of weights
is virtually impossible. We use personal income in each state to weight
statutory marginal tax rates, since this is highly correlated with payroll
and with sales. Since it is based on residence, however, personal income
may be less well correlated with corporate property. These data are
available for the first quarter of 1980 in the July 1980 Survey of Current
Business. The personal-income-weighted average of state marginal
corporate tax rates, including a zero rate for states without a corporate
tax, is 6.55 percent. If we multiply this rate by (1 - 0.46) to account for
deductibility at the federal level, we get a net rate of 3.54 percent. Adding
0.46 for the federal tax itself, we have 0.495 for the value of T.
7
6.2.3 Tax Allowances for Depreciation and Inventories
Because provisions related to depreciation are relatively less straight-
forward, we first discuss provisions related to inventories. United States
corporations are allowed to use any of a number of consistent accounting
methods, including last in, first out (LIFO) and first in, first out (FIFO).
8
Unlike other countries in this study, however, the United States requires
firms to use the same method for profits reported to shareholders as they
use for profits reported to taxing authorities.
With recent increases in the rate of inflation, many firms have been
switching from FIFO to LIFO accounting. Because first-bought inven-
tory items have a lower nominal cost than the last-bought items, FIFO
profits are larger than LIFO profits for a given sales price. Firm managers
might like to report FIFO profits to shareholders, especially if executive
6. McLure (1980) argues that these apportionment formulas change the effect of a
particular state's corporate income tax from a tax on income to an excise tax on sales,
payrolls, or property. We have a national perspective, however. Our marginal investment is
made in proportion to existing capital with its existing allocation among assets, industries,
and states. The earnings from such an investment would incour additional state corporate
income tax liability at the weighted-average rate.
7. This calculation ignores the deductibility of federal corporate taxes in some state tax
systems.
8. Other allowable methods include an "average cost" method, a "standard cost"
method, and an "actual cost" method. See Shoven and Bulow (1975) for further discussion
of these accounting choices.205 The Tax System
salaries or bonuses are based on reported profits. On the other hand,
taxes can be reduced by reporting relatively smaller LIFO profits to the
IRS. It is thus surprising that only 30 percent of manufacturing invento-
ries and only 22 percent of retail trade inventories were on a LIFO basis in
1979.
9 Most large corporations are on LIFO accounting, so perhaps small
businesses find it easier to remain on FIFO.
Two possibilities exist for our parameter v, the proportion of invento-
ries on FIFO accounting. In our standard case, we set v to zero and
assume that firms act so as to minimize taxes in this regard. (This assump-
tion is consistent with the use of minimum lifetimes and maximum
acceleration in the depreciation of assets discussed below.) As an alterna-
tive, we report results for the case where v is set to 0.7, the actual
proportion of manufacturing inventories on FIFO in 1979.
We turn now to look at depreciation allowances for tax purposes. Tax
law, government data, and United States studies typically divide assets
into "equipment" and "structures," but these categories correspond to
our "machinery" and "buildings" categories. All assets received straight-
line allowances with the beginning of the personal and corporate income
taxes in 1913, but considerable choice was available on tax lifetimes. The
Treasury Department first published a set of suggested lifetimes in its
Bulletin Fof 1931, and depreciation allowances were still based on those
estimates in 1980. Tightening and controversy followed with the length-
ening of suggested lifetimes in the 1942 edition of Bulletin F.
Reversing this trend in 1954, Congress decided to allow accelerated
methods of depreciation. In particular, both equipment and structures
were allowed double declining balance (DDB) or sum-of-the-years'-
digits (SYD) methods of depreciation.
1
0 The actual adoption of acceler-
9. Data are from the United States Commerce Department publication Current Indus-
trial Reports (Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories and Orders) and from Current Busi-
ness Reports (1979 Retail Trade).
10. This footnote describes each depreciation scheme in more detail. For straight-line
depreciation, the law specifies a lifetime for tax purposes L, and it allows the taxpayer to
deduct ML of the purchase price of the asset each year for L years. The asset is fully
depreciated after L years. For sum-of-the-years'-digits (SYD), the taxpayer starts by
calculating a SUM, equal to S/i, /. The purchase price is multiplied by L/SUM for
depreciation in the first year, (L - 1)/SUM for depreciation in the second year, down to
I/SUM for depreciation in the last year. If L = 3, for example, the purchase price is
allocated as 3/6, 2/6, and 1/6 across the three years, and again the asset is fully depreciated.
With double declining balance (DDB), the taxpayer can take twice the straight-line rate,
but on a declining balance basis. That is, first-year depreciation is2/Lof the purchase price,
but second-year depreciation is 21L of the remaining basis (1 - 21V). As described in the
text, some assets receive less than twice the straight-line rate. With "150 percent of
declining-balance," for example, taxpayers can deduct 1.5/L of the purchase price in the
first year and 1.51L of remaining basis in later years. We refer to the numerator of this ratio
as B in our equations below. Under declining balance methods, however, the asset is never
fully depreciated. The United States law allows taxpayers to switch from the declining
balance method to one of the other methods to complete depreciation deductions. The
optimal times to make such switches are described in the text below.206 The United States
ated methods has, however, been gradual. Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981)
estimate that the proportion of assets using these methods jumped from
0.30 to 0.52 between 1954 and 1955, but then grew more slowly to 0.85 in
1978. Adjustment costs and traditional accounting practices are the ma-
jor available explanations for the continued use of less accelerated
methods.
At least partly in response to taxpayer practices of using shorter asset
lives for tax purposes, in 1962 the Treasury issued "Guidelines" with a 30
to 40 percent shortening of suggested Bulletin F lives. These changes
were accompanied by the 1962 introduction of the investment tax credit
(ITC) discussed in the next section. Although the "Long Amendment"
specified that the basis for depreciation was to be net of the ITC, this
amendment was repealed in 1964, and investors were allowed to increase
the basis of assets bought in 1962 and 1963.
Later changes included the 1969 elimination of double declining bal-
ance for structures other than public utility structures. New nonresiden-
tial structures were reduced from 200 percent to 150 percent of declining
balance, while used nonresidential structures were reduced from 150
percent to straight-line.
In 1971 the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system further liberal-
ized depreciation allowances for equipment and public utility structures
by permitting lifetimes that were 20 percent above or below the Guide-
line lifetimes (which were themselves 30-40 percent lower than those of
Bulletin F). Taxpayers did not always adopt the shortest lifetimes avail-
able, because longer lifetimes made some assets eligible for higher rates
of investment tax credit. In particular, the asset's life must be at least
seven years to qualify for the full 10 percent credit, at least five years to
qualify for two-thirds of that credit, and at least three years to qualify for
one-third of the credit.
The law also includes a requirement that assets not be depreciated
below their ultimate scrap values. However, the assumed scrap value as a
proportion of asset value has been considerably reduced in recent years.
The reduction in allowances comes at the end of the depreciation stream
for the declining balance methods, and the present value effect of the
scrap value provisions must be very small. As a result, this complication
can be ignored.
We now turn to a detailed examination of depreciation allowances as
they stood in 1980 (the "old law"), to be followed by an examination of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982. We assume that the hypothetical project
under study is one undertaken by a corporation using the most favorable
depreciation method, and we assume that the investment under consid-
eration is a new asset, not a used one.207 The Tax System
For the old law, Guideline lifetimes are specified for hundreds of
different assets. To reduce this number to more manageable proportions,
several studies have provided information on an aggregation to the
thirty-four asset types listed in table 6.5. For example, Hulten and
Wykoff (1981) have estimated economic depreciation rates based on this
aggregation. These estimates, shown in column 1 of table 6.5, are dis-
cussed in the next section. The first twenty assets are types of equipment
and will ultimately be aggregated into a single asset for the purposes of
this study. The following fourteen assets are types of structures, also to be
aggregated for this study. Inventories are treated elsewhere.
These thirty-four assets are used in different proportions by each of our
three industries (manufacturing, other industry, and commerce). To
obtain the relevant thirty-four by three matrix, we aggregated more
detailed capital stock data provided by Dale Jorgenson.
1
1 As described
below, these 1977 capital stocks are used in weighting depreciation rates
of column 1 and investment tax credit rates of column 2 to obtain
industry-specific values for 8 and g.
We also use these capital stocks to obtain industry-specific values for
tax depreciation allowances, but this procedure is considerably more
complicated for two reasons. First, United States tax law does not specify
any exponential depreciation rate suitable for use as the parameter a,
defined in chapter 2. Instead, tax lifetimes and depreciation formulas are
used directly to calculate Az, defined as the present value of depreciation
allowances for a dollar of investment, in each of the thirty-four assets
under each law. Multiplication by T provides Ad, defined in chapter 2 as
the tax saving from these depreciation deductions. Second, the law differs
for each of the thirty-four assets. In particular, the "buildings" asset in
this study includes public utility structures, which are allowed double
declining balance like equipment, plus other structures, which receive
only 150 percent of declining balance under the old law (175 percent
under the 1981 and 1982 laws). We use the capital stock matrix to
calculate a weighted average of the present value of depreciation allow-
ances in each industry, first over the twenty types of equipment and then
over the fourteen types of structures. In this case, however, capital stocks
do not provide the correct weights by themselves. After we describe
depreciations allowances below, we refer to Appendix D for a procedure
to average allowances over the twenty types of equipment or fourteen
types of structures in each industry.
To proceed, for the old law Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) have aggre-
gated the Guideline lifetimes for hundreds of assets into thirty-four
11. See Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980), and section
6.3.2 for more detail.208 The United States
Table 6.5 Depreciation, Investment Tax Credit (ITC) Rates,
and Tax Lifetimes by Asset Class
Asset Class
1. Furniture and fixtures
2. Fabricated metal products




7. Mining and oilfield machinery
8. Metalworking machinery
9. Special industry machinery
10. General industrial machinery
11. Office and computing machinery
12. Service industry machinery
13. Electrical equipment
14. Trucks, buses, and trailers
15. Autos
16. Aircraft









26. Other nonfarm buildings
27. Railroads
28. Telephone and telegraph
29. Electric light and power
30. Gas
31. Other public utilities
32. Farm structures
33. Mining, shafts, and wells



































































































































































































Source: Depreciation rates are from Hulten and Wykoff (1981). For public utility struc-
tures (assets 27-31), Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) provide estimates based on the Hulten/
Wykoff methodology. Investment tax credit rates and lifetimes are from Fullerton and
Henderson (1981) and are described in the text.209 The Tax System
lifetimes, based on the aggregations of table 6.5. These lifetimes provide
estimates of the midpoints of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR)
system. Most structures are assigned these lives directly, but the ADR
system allows 20 percent longer or shorter lives for equipment (assets
1-20) and public utility structures (assets 27-31). Because of our optimiz-
ing tax practice assumption, these assets are assigned lives that are 80
percent of ADR midpoints, except where the use of a longer life would
reduce effective taxes through eligibility for a higher investment tax
credit. In order to concentrate on tax law rather than on actual practices,
we ignore the possibility of shorter lives substantiated by facts and
circumstances. The resulting vector of lives, shown in column 3 of table
6.5, is consistent with the ITC vector in that three- and five-year assets get
one-third and two-thirds of the full investment tax credit, respectively.
1
2
This vector of lives also appears in Fullerton and Henderson (1981).
For equipment (assets 1-20) and public utility structures (assets 27-
31), the old law allows double declining balance (DDB), with a switch to
sum-of-the-years'-digits (SYD). See footnote 10 for description of these
schemes. This combination is used here as tax-minimizing practice be-
cause it can be shown to provide the earliest possible depreciation
deductions.
1
3 Define L as the asset's lifetime for tax purposes, an integer
number of years. Define Ls as the time of the optimal switch, and B as the
"declining balance rate." The B parameter refers to the multiplier for the
straight-line rate when depreciation is allowed on a declining basis. That
is B — 2.0 for double declining balance, and B = 1.5 for 150 percent of
declining balance. We can then define a' = B/L as the exponential rate for
the first part of the asset's life. The prime distinguishes this parameter
from the exponential rate that would apply to the asset's whole life. Since
DDB starts out with higher depreciation allowances, and since SYD on
the remaining basis must eventually exceed DDB, the optimal switching
point can be found by equating depreciation under the two methods:
12. Lifetimes for many of the thirty-four assets are actually averaged over more diverse
asset categories. As a result, only some of the assets in one of our categories may need their
lifetimes adjusted to receive higher credits. Since the aggregation to thirty-four assets
provides considerable detail, however, it seems appropriate to treat each asset as individu-
ally homogeneous. One example where this treatment may be less appropriate is in mining,
shafts, and wells. The 6.8 year life here reflects an average of intangible drilling with a zero
life and other structures with a longer life.
13. See Shoven and Bulow (1975). If a firm expects a steady stream of positive taxable
profits, as assumed, it would always take depreciation allowances as early as possible. In
other circumstances, however, the firm may prefer later deductions. Under the old law, the
firm could delay its depreciation by delaying the switch or by using straight-line. The 1981
and 1982 laws are less flexible, however, because they mandate the switchover time that
would be optimal for the firm wanting the earliest deductions. All laws allow the flexibility to
combine just straight-line depreciation with longer tax lives, but this decision can be made





where the F function is defined by
(6.2) F(x)= I (x-j)
iix is an integer. As seen below for cases where x is not an integer, the
summation goes from zero to the integer part of x.
For such equipment, the firm would use DDB in the first year, would
be indifferent in the second year, and would switch to SYD by the third
year of the asset's life. However, tax laws make use of the half-year
convention, assuming that all assets were bought on 1 July. The firm thus
uses DDB for Ls = 1.5 years, and SYD afterward. Take, for example, a
one-dollar asset with L = 5, B = 2, and a' = 0.40. Then the firm would
deduct 0.2 (half of a') in the year of purchase and 0.32 (a' times 0.8) in the
first full taxable year. Switching to SYD for the 0.48 remaining basis over
3.5 years, the firm would use numerators of 3.5, 2.5,1.5, and 0.5 respec-
tively. The sum of those figures for the denominator is 8.0, as defined by
F(L — Ls) in equation (6.2), where L — Ls is not an integer. Because
allowances are on a historical cost basis, these nominal future deprecia-
tion deductions are discounted at the nominal (after-tax) discount rate p.
Since Az was defined as the present value of depreciation allowances on a
current dollar of investment, the general expression under 1980 law for
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To save space, the integration is not performed here.
For structures (assets 21-26 and 32-34), the old law specifies a 150
percent declining balance rate (B = 1.5) with a switch to straight-line.
14. This expression avoids assuming a continuously declining basis, which would in-
accurately leave e "
 s remaining at the time of the switch. Instead, we follow the law by
specifying yearly adjustments to basis. Also, because we discount continuously, deprecia-
tion deductions at the beginning of the year are worth more than those at the end of the year.
This procedure explicitly recognizes that depreciation deductions are "coincident" with the
associated earnings and tax liability.211 The Tax System
The switch time Ls is again found where the two methods provide the
same deductions. Since continued exponential deductions would allow a
rate BIL on remaining basis, and since straight-line would allow 1/
(L - Ls) on the same remaining basis, we can set these two expressions
equal to each other and solve for Ls as:
(6.4)
Thus the firm would switch after one-third of the asset's life, but it must
begin straight-line at the start of a tax year. For a twenty-five year asset,
for example, Ls would be 8.33 years. If we assume midyear purchase
dates on average, the firm actually switches after 8.5 years. The general
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The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 changed both the investment
tax credit, as described in the next section, and depreciation allowances.
It introduced the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), under
which any depreciable asset falls into one of four classes and is given a tax
life of three, five, ten, or fifteen years. The ACRS lifetimes for our
thirty-four assets are shown in column 5 of table 6.5. The law assigns a
three-year life to autos, light trucks, R&D equipment, certain race-
horses, and personal property with an ADR midpoint of four years or
less. Our level of aggregation shows autos with a three-year life, but none
of the other assets has an (average) ADR midpoint of four years or less.
All other equipment gets a five-year life.
A ten-year life is granted to any public utility structure with an ADR
midpoint between eighteen and twenty-five years. Since the "gas" and
"other public utility" categories have ADR midpoints of less than twen-
ty-five years, we assign a ten-year life to these two assets under ACRS.
Finally, a fifteen-year life is assigned to public utility structures with an
ADR midpoint of more than twenty-five years, and to all other structures
except mining, shafts, and wells, which we reduce from 6.8 years to a
five-year life. Thus, all thirty-four assets receive lifetimes that are shorter
than the minimum allowable under the old law, and tax lives are no
longer based on estimates of expected useful lives.212 The United States
Although these shorter lives were effective immediately, the 1981 law
specifies a depreciation schedule that is less accelerated during a five-year
phase-in period. In 1981, purchases of equipment and public utility
structures were allowed only 150 percent of declining balance, switching
to straight-line, and from 1982 to 1985 they were scheduled to receive 175
percent, switching to SYD. They were scheduled to receive double
declining balance again starting in 1986. We will investigate only the
posttransition allowances that were scheduled to start in 1986.
Under the ultimate 1981 law, equipment and public utility structures
receive DDB switching to SYD as before, so we could almost get away
with substituting the new lifetimes into equation (6.3) from the old law to
obtain Az, the present value of allowances. However, the 1981 law moves
up depreciation from the last half-year. As a result, the three-year class is
depreciated in only 2.5 years, the five-year class in 4.5 years, and the
ten-year class in 9.5 years. For the five-year asset example, depreciation
deductions are 0.2 in the first half-year (half of BIL) and 0.32 in the first
full year {BIL times 0.8), but the remaining 0.48 basis is given SYD
treatment over only three remaining years. Also, the taxpayer is not
given the choice of when to switch. If the firm selects a five-year life for
equipment, the law actually provides a table requiring deductions of 0.2,
0.32,0.24,0.16, and 0.08, starting in the year of purchase. We thus have a
general expression for Az under the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act for
equipment and public utility structures in 1986:
.5 1.5
Az = a' (e-
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This formula is essentially that used to calculate the depreciation amounts
specified in the tables of the law.
Other structures have no transition but immediately increase from 150
to 175 percent of declining balance. They still switch to straight-line,
however, and the last half-year is not moved up. As a result, we can set B
to 1.75 and use formulas from the old law for structures. Equation (6.4)
implies that the switch point is 3/7 of L. For a fifteen-year asset purchased
1 July, Ls is set to 6.5 years, and equation (6.5) provides the present value
of depreciation allowances, Az.
The 1981 act represented a dramatic tax change, but not only because
of the business provisions described here. Personal tax cuts and many
other features of the act are described in section 6.4.2. While the Reagan
administration may have planned commensurate cuts in government
expenditures, the 1981-82 recession served both to reduce revenue and to213 The Tax System
increase required expenditures relative to planned amounts. In light of
high deficit projections, growing concern over deficits, and claims that the
1981 tax cuts were tilted in favor of business, Congress passed the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. This act retains the per-
sonal tax cuts, the ACRS lifetimes, and the ITC rates of the 1981 act, but
it repeals the last two phases of the transition for equipment and public
utility structures. These assets are left with 150 percent of declining
balance (switching to straight-line) rather than progressing to 175 and 200
percent of declining balance (switching to SYD). Further, the 1982 act
reduces the depreciation basis by half of the investment tax credit.
Operationally, for equipment (assets 1-20) and public utility structures
(assets 27-31), we set B equal to 1.5 and use equations (6.4) and (6.5) to
calculate Az. We then multiply by (1 - g/2) to get the present value of
allowances per dollar of investment.
1
5 Other structures are unchanged
from the 1981 law, using B = 1.75 and the same equations.
For any law, we now have Az for each of the thirty-four assets. This Az
was defined as the present value of depreciation allowances for a dollar of
current investment, but we want the present value of allowances for a
dollar of maintained capital stock. A distinction arises because reinvest-
ment in later years also receives accelerated allowances (at historical
cost). For this reason, each Az is weighted not by capital stocks alone, but
by existing capital plus the present value of reinvestment required to
replace capital in each asset and industry. A short-lived asset receives
relatively more weight because it requires more reinvestment qualifying
for depreciation deductions Az. This procedure is fully described in
Appendix D.
The correctly averaged Az for equipment or structures in each indus-
try, called Az in Appendix D, is multiplied by T to obtain Ad, the present
value of tax savings from these future depreciation deductions. These tax
savings thus depend in a very nonlinear manner on p, and they cannot be
calculated until this nominal after-tax discount rate is available. In the
fixed-r case this requirement presents no obstacle. In the fixed-/? case,
however, equation (2.23) of chapter 2 shows that Ad is required before
the discount rate can be calculated. This simultaneity cannot be resolved
by an analytical solution for p. Instead, we iterate to find an interest rate p
that is consistent with both sets of equations.
Finally, for the United States data set, the f2 parameter is set to zero,
indicating no immediate free depreciation of investment. The fx param-
15. Tables in the 1981 and 1982 laws specify actual percentages of purchase price to be
depreciated each year for each asset. These percentages can all be derived from our
formulas, with one exception. For five-year equipment in 1981, B is 1.5, and the optimal
switch to straight-line would occur after one-third the life of the asset. With the half-year
convention Ls would be 2.5. Because of early-year revenue constraints, however, the 1981
tables require a switch to straight-line after only the first half-year. These amounts were
multiplied by (1 -g/2) to provide tables for the 1982 law. We capture this effect by
specifying Ls = 0.5 for five-year assets under the 1982 law.214 The United States
eter is set to one, indicating that all equipment and structures depreciate
for tax purposes according to the formulas above. Inventories receive no
depreciation allowances.
6.2.4 Estimates of Economic Depreciation
The most recent and most comprehensive estimates of economic de-
preciation in the United States are found in Hulten and Wykoff (1981).
They use prices observed from secondhand asset markets to infer the
declines in asset values that occur with age, taking inflation into account.
To avoid "censored sample bias," a problem associated with the fact that
prices would not be available for retired assets, they use separate data on
retirements to obtain survival probabilities. The "average" price for an
asset of a particular vintage is then its observed price times its survival
probability (plus zero times its retirement probability). A potential dif-
ficulty is that assets appearing in the secondhand markets may be system-
atically inferior to those retained by original owners. If buyers cannot
distinguish between normal assets and these inferior assets, called
"lemons" by Akerlof (1970), then market prices would understate the
average value of a particular vintage. Hulten and Wykoff argue that this
problem is not serious for business resale markets. Since buyers are
sophisticated specialists, sellers cannot expect to gain from offering only
their inferior assets. Furthermore, assets such as construction machinery
are often bought for particular jobs and sold afterward.
Hulten and Wykoff use "blue book" and other business asset price
data directly for eight asset categories. They test alternative assumptions
about the time profile of depreciation, and they conclude that exponen-
tial decay is much more data-compatible than straight-line or one-horse-
shay depreciation. The weakest link in their procedure is the derivation
of thirty-two depreciation rates from the eight directly estimated rates.
For each of these thirty-two assets, the Commerce Department provides
an estimate of actual economic life, assuming that depreciation is straight
line. Call this economic life L (but note that this concept differs from the
tax lifetime discussed in the previous section).
If each asset does decay exponentially, and if each has an associated
lifetime L, then each depreciation rate can be described by
(6.7) 8 = |,
where B is the "declining balance rate" for economic depreciation.
Again, this concept differs from the legal B of the previous section, but B
— 2 would imply that actual depreciation was on a declining basis at twice
the straight-line rate defined by L. Since they have 8 and L for their six
directly estimated equipment types, Hulten and Wykoff use (6.7) to find
an average B of 1.65 for equipment. They use this B with other lifetimes215
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Source: Own calculations from Hulten and Wykoff (1981) depreciation rates and Jorgen-
son's unpublished capital stock matrix, as described in the text.
in equation (6.7) to get a 8 for each type of equipment. Similarly, they
find an average B of 0.91 for their two directly estimated structure types,
and they use this B with other lifetimes in equation (6.7) to get a 8 for each
type of structure. These rates are shown in column 1 of table 6.5. They
range from a low of 0.0176 for railroad structures to a high of 0.3333 for
automobiles.
Since each industry's capital stock in each asset is available from the
unpublished Jorgenson data, we can calculate separate weighted aver-
ages for each of our three industry groups. These rates are shown in table
6.6, based on the Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates. They do not depend
on the discount rate.
1
6
Equipment (or machinery in the terminology of this study) depreciates
at about 13 percent per year except in the commercial industry, with its
high weight on autos and trucks. Structures (or buildings) depreciate at
rates between 2.5 and 3.4 percent per year, as shown in the table.
6.2.5 Investment Grants and Incentives
The investment tax credit (ITC) was introduced in 1962 at a 7 percent
rate on equipment and a 3 percent rate on public utility property. It was
repealed in 1969 but was reintroduced in 1971 at a 7 percent rate on
equipment and a 4 percent rate on public utility property. A 1975 act
temporarily increased the credit to 10 percent for both types of assets and
eliminated the 50 percent limit on the amount of tax liability that could be
offset. In 1978 the 10 percent credit was made permanent, and taxpayers
were allowed to offset all of the first $25,000 of tax liability and 90 percent
of any remaining liability.
The 1980 statutory rate of credit is 10 percent for all qualifying equip-
ment and special-purpose structures, but the latter definition has been
16. To see that the capital stocks are the correct weights for economic depreciation rates,
we could perform an exercise similar to that performed for tax depreciation in Appendix D.
Take the present value of actual depreciation on a dollar of current investment in each of the
disaggregate assets, and add the present value of depreciation on the reinvestment neces-
sary to maintain a dollar of real capital. Take a capital-weighted average of those present
values, then ask what depreciation rate 8 on an aggregate maintained asset would yield the
same value of depreciation. The answer for $ reduces to a AT-weighted average of 8,.216 The United States
broadened to include more than half of our total structures category.
1
7 As
mentioned, the credit was only two-thirds effective for assets with lives
less than seven years, one-third effective for assets with lives less than five
years, and not effective for assets with lives less than three years. Fur-
thermore, owing to inadequate taxable profits, some credits had to be
carried forward and some were never able to be used. As a result of all
these considerations, Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) estimate that the
effective 1980 tax credit rates for equipment and structures were 0.078
and 0.045, respectively.
In this study, however, we focus on a company with sufficient profits to
enable it to use the statutory rates of credit. The 1980 statutory ITC rates
for each of our thirty-four assets are shown in column 2 of table 6.5 above.
These rates are the same as those in Fullerton and Henderson (1981).
We use Jorgenson's capital stocks separately for each industry in
weighting the investment tax credits over the twenty types of equipment
and the fourteen types of structures. Here again, however, capital stocks
by themselves do not provide correct weights. If an asset depreciates
faster than average, it will have more than the average amount of re-
investment associated with maintaining it. Because replacement invest-
ment also qualifies for the ITC, the weight on such an asset should be
larger than its current stock.
Appendix D describes our procedures for calculating g, the average of
investment grant ratesg, for each asset and industry. Weights are equal to
capital plus the present value of replacement investment. As a result, g
cannot be expressed as raw data but must be calculated for each p and TT
combination. One set of g for 1980 is shown in table 6.7. The 0.07833
discount rate for this example corresponds to debt finance in the fixed-r
case with the actual United States inflation experience. Rates for equip-
ment are close to 0.10, as would be expected by looking at the rates in
column 2 of table 6.5. Only tractors, trucks, and autos have statutory
rates less than 0.10. These assets have large weights in commerce and in
other industry, so their g values are 0.0852 and 0.0897, respectively.
Manufacturing gets a 0.0957 effective rate. Structures receive no invest-
ment credit, except for the 0.0978 rate in other industry, which includes
public utility structures.
Table 6.8 shows ITC rates under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981. These are very similar to those for 1980, except that the statutory
credit for autos has been increased from 0.033 to 0.06, and that for trucks
and trailers has been increased from 0.067 to 0.10, as shown in column 4
of table 6.5.
The value of g for inventories is always zero. Finally, the f3 parameters
17. Special-purpose structures are those that "are replaced contemporaneously with the
























Source: Own calculations from data in Fullerton and Henderson (1981) and Jorgenson's
unpublished capital stock matrix. The values in this table are based on a 0.07833 nominal
discount rate, as obtains for debt finance in the case where r is fixed at 0.05, mis 0.3559, and
inflation is at the 0.0677 actual United States rate.
Table 6.8 Investment Tax Credit Rates under the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, by Asset and Industry
Machinery Buildings
Industry (Equipment) (Structures) Inventories
Manufacturing .0984 .0 .0
Other industry .0988 .0978 .0
Commerce .0941 .0 .0
Source: Own calculations from data in Fullerton and Henderson (1981) and Jorgenson's
unpublished capital stock matrix. The values in this table are based on a 0.07833 nominal
discount rate, as obtains for debt finance in the case where r is fixed at 0.05, mis 0.3559, and
inflation is at the 0.0677 actual United States rate.
are all set to one, indicating that all investments qualify for effective
credit rates g.
6.2.6 Local Taxes
Personal and corporate income taxes at the local level were discussed
in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Local governments also collect considerable
revenue from sales taxes, business and occupation taxes, license fees, and
gross receipt taxes on public utilities. These taxes are not relevant for this
study, since we are concerned with taxes for which the base is capital or
capital income. Some states do collect a "corporate franchise" or "net
worth" tax, however, with capital assets as the tax base. These were
incorporated into the statutory state corporate income tax rates, dis-
cussed above.
The major remaining tax on capital is the property tax, providing at
least a quarter of total state and local revenues. Thousands of local
jurisdictions each set their own statutory rate, and they each have their
own assessment practices. A given asset may be subject to interjurisdic-
tional differences in statutory rates or interjurisdictional differences in
average assessed-value/market-value ratios. In addition, assets can be
treated differently within a jurisdiction if some assets have not been218 The United States
reassessed recently and have assessment ratios different from the aver-
age. Generally, the statutory rates differ for real property (buildings and
land) and for personal property (machinery, inventory, livestock, motor
vehicles, furniture, etc.).
We would like to estimate the average effective rate of property tax on
each asset in each industry. Because Jorgenson's 1977 capital stock
matrix is available, we could divide 1977 property taxes in each category
by the corresponding stock of capital. Unfortunately, however, property
tax payments are not generally broken down by both asset and industry.
Because there are substantial rate differentials between equipment and
structures, we will disaggregate by asset, not by industry.
Table 6.9 summarizes the calculation of effective property tax rates.
The first row presents data from the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations (ACIR), available only for 1972. This row shows
that 28.6 percent of property taxes were paid on business realty (land and
structures) and that 11.8 percent were paid on business personalty
(equipment and inventories). No further disaggregation is available.
These figures include both the corporate and the noncorporate sectors
but exclude public utility taxes, which were not divided between realty
and personalty. Data from the Commerce Department's Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis show that a total of $62,535 billion of state and local
property taxes was paid in 1977. If we assume that the allocation of these
Table 6.9 Derivation
1. Proportion of total
1972 property tax
2. Estimated 1977 tax
(multiply (1) by
$62,535 billion)
3. Jorgenson's 1977 capital
stocks in $ billion
4. Estimated rate of tax
(divide (2) by (3))
























Source: Proportions in row 1 are from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR), as found in Harriss (1974). They exclude the 0.075 proportion of 1972
property taxes paid by public utilities. The 1977 property tax figure in row 2 is from the
Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis. Capital stocks in row 3 are from
Dale Jorgenson's unpublished data. We have excluded public utility capital in order to
match the available tax data.219 The Tax System
taxes was the same as in 1972, then $17,885 billion was paid on business
realty and $7,379 billion on equipment and inventories, as shown in
row 2.
The appropriate denominator for realty is the aggregate of Jorgenson's
corporate and noncorporate capital stocks over land and all types of
structures in all industries except public utilities ($1,588.5 billion, as
shown in row 3 of table 6.9). For personalty, the appropriate denomina-
tor is the aggregate of Jorgenson's corporate and noncorporate capital
stocks over inventories and all types of equipment in all industries except
public utilities ($960.4 billion, also shown in the table). Division, in row 4
of the table, provides 0.01126 as the effective property tax rate on realty,
applied to buildings in this study, and 0.00768 as the effective rate on
personalty, applied to machinery and inventories in this study.
Though our study does not include residential capital explicitly, it is
nevertheless interesting to compare the 0.01126 business realty rate to a
household realty rate. Table 6.9 shows $31.33 billion of 1977 property
taxes on household realty, including rented and owner-occupied housing.
The February 1981 Survey of Current Business shows $1,705.7 billion as
the appropriate denominator, providing 0.01837 as the effective property
tax rate on housing. Thus the United States, in contrast to the United
Kingdom, for example, imposes higher effective property tax rates on
households than on business. Houses are sold more often than business
realty, so there are longer lags in the reassessment of business property.
In addition, jurisdictions often compete for incoming businesses by offer-
ing temporary tax abatements.
In fact, because a firm can bargain with a number of cities before
deciding where to locate, a city might provide a ten-year tax holiday for
the buildings of that firm alone. These property tax abatements lower the
payments of only new entrants, implying that the marginal property tax
rate could be less than the average tax rate calculated here.
Finally, because of the mobility among the many taxing jurisdictions,
followers of Tiebout (1956) might argue that the local property tax
payments must be exactly offset by the value of local public goods in each
jurisdiction. As with other tax calculations in this study, however, our




18. The property tax in each jurisdiction is used to finance local public expenditure
benefits that can offset any disincentive effects of the tax. Fischel (1975) and White (1975)
argue, for example, that communities compete to obtain commercial and industrial prop-
erty, implying that a community would be indifferent to the entry of a marginal firm in
equilibrium. If we sought net budget incentive effects, and if this argument were correct,
then the effective property tax rate should be set to zero. The use of nonzero rates can be
taken as a rejection of this argument, or as an attempt to measure purely tax effects rather
than net effects of government activity. See Fullerton and Gordon (1983) for further
discussion and alternative simulations with and without distorting property taxes.220 The United States
6.2.7 Wealth Taxes
Various forms of state and local net wealth taxes and property taxes
have already been reviewed. At the federal level, article I, section 9 of the
United States Constitution prohibits direct taxation. Since the Sixteenth
Amendment specifically introduced a federal income tax, the constitu-
tionality of a federal wealth tax is left in doubt. There is a federal estate
tax, and this section describes some of its features. As specified in chapter
2, however, the estate tax does not enter our calculations.
In 1980 the federal estate tax had a graduated structure with the
equivalent of a $175,000 initial exemption. The marginal tax rate reached
70 percent for estates over $5 million. Half of an estate was not taxable if
left to a spouse. Estate tax returns were filed for only about 9 percent of
deaths, and only 40 percent of those filing returns had to pay any tax.
These taxes amounted to less than 2 percent of federal revenue.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 specifies a transition period
during which the exemption equivalent is increased and the top marginal
tax rate is decreased. After 1987 there will be no tax on estates up to
$600,000, and the top marginal rate will be 50 percent. Also, unlimited
property can be left to a spouse without tax. These provisions will
essentially eliminate estate taxes as a source of revenue.
For purposes of this study, the personal wealth tax rates of all three
ownership categories are set to zero. The vectors of wealth tax rates for
each asset are given by the effective property tax rates of the preceding
section. These parameters are summarized in table 6.10.
6.2.8 Household Tax Rates
To estimate weighted-average personal tax rates on marginal increases
in various types of income, we use the tax simulation (TAXSIM) model of
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The model and our
estimation procedures are described in section 6.2.1, and the estimates
based on these procedures are shown in table 6.11. These marginal rates
apply to 1977, the most recent year for which TAXSIM calculations are
available. Inflation would have pushed many households into higher
marginal rate brackets by 1980, but the Revenue Act of 1978 readjusted
the nominal boundaries of the brackets. While explicit recalculation of
Table 6.10 Wealth Tax Rates
Tax-Exempt Insurance
Personal Wealth Tax Households Institutions Companies
wp 0 0 0
Corporate Wealth Tax Equipment Structures Inventories
wc .00768 .01126 .00768


































Source: Calculations from NBER's tax simulation (TAXSIM) model. As described in the
text, the statutory capital gains rates of row 4 are halved (because of the increase of basis at
death) to obtain row 5. These rates are approximately halved again (because of deferred
realizations) to obtain row 6.
1980 rates is desirable, we have no procedure that rivals the quality of the
TAXSIM procedures for 1977. Thus, the table 6.11 rates are employed for
our 1980 calculations.
For wage income, the federal marginal tax rate from this model is 27
percent, while the combined state and federal rate is about 32 percent.
For interest income, these rates are also 27 percent and 32 percent,
respectively ™ For dividend income, the federal and combined rates are
41 percent and 47.5 percent. To account for the dividend deduction,
these calculations assign a zero tax rate to the dividends received by those
with less than $100 of dividends ($200 for joint returns). These estimates
correspond closely to the dividend rates estimated by Brinner and Brooks
(1981). Their combined state and federal tax was 43.2 percent for 1953-
79 and 49 percent for 1979 alone.
Retained earnings are taxed by the personal income tax only to the
extent that they induce share appreciation over historical cost, and then
only when realized. This deferral advantage clearly depends on the
average length of the holding period or the proportion of gains to be
realized each year. Furthermore, about half of gains are never realized
because of the increase of basis at death. (No capital gains taxes are paid
out of the estate, but the basis for calculating capital gains of the new
owner is set equal to market value at the time of inheritance.) These
considerations reduce the present value of expected taxes on current
accrued capital gains.
With only 40 percent of realized gains taxable in 1979-80, and with a
top marginal rate of 70 percent, the highest nominal rate of tax on capital
19. Feldstein and Summers (1979) report a 25 percent federal rate on interest income
from the TAXSIM model but use a 35 percent rate on corporate bond interest to account for its
greater concentration in high-income brackets. Without a breakdown of interest receipts in
each bracket, it is appropriate to take the 32 percent combined state and federal tax rate for
use in this study.222 The United States
gains would be 28 percent. NBER's TAXSIM model places the federal
capital gains rate at 26 percent, reflecting a very high concentration of
capital gains in the high-income brackets. To account for state taxes, we
use 28 percent as the combined nominal statutory rate.
2
0
In other studies of taxes in the United States, a common assumption is
that this nominal rate is halved owing to the deferral advantage and
halved again owing to the increase of basis at death. It is sometimes
argued that the resulting 0.07 effective tax rate on accrued capital gains is
still too high, because investors can selectively realize their losses and
hold onto their gains.
To account for deferral in this study, we multiply the capital gains rate
by the effective accrued tax (EAT) ratio found in chapter 2:
(6.8) EAT ratio = —^— ,
K +
where \ is the proportion of accrued gains realized each year and pp is the
investor's rate of discount. Suppose that X is set to 0.1, reflecting an
average lag of ten years between accrual and realization. The proper
discount rate is the investor's nominal after-tax interest rate, a rate that
depends on the combination under consideration. As an illustration,
consider the fixed-r case. For the particular calculation where inflation
adds TT/(1 — ni) to nominal interest rates, r is 0.05, and TT is 0.0677, the
nominal interest rate is 0.155 before tax. If the investors are households
with the 0.325 marginal tax rate on interest income, their interest rate is
0.105 after tax. With this discount rate, the EAT ratio is 0.539, and the
capital gains rate is still approximately halved owing to deferral. In our
calculations the ratio is endogenous because it depends on pp, the
personal discount rate, which depends on inflation and the ownership
category.
In this study we further halve the capital gains rate to account for the
increase of basis at death and the selective realization of losses. This
adjustment cannot be justified on solid empirical grounds, but it does
make our procedures comparable to those of other United States tax
studies that have adopted the same assumption.
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We turn now to the treatment of banks. In general, we assume that
banks are financial intermediaries through which households hold part of
their ownership of corporate capital. Since bank holdings of corporate
equities are small enough to be safely ignored, we use the personal tax
rates described above for all household dividend income and capital
gains.
20. Because the TAXSIM model has complete tax return information with complete tax
law specifications, the estimated nominal rate would reflect the alternative tax limitations
and the inclusion of untaxed gains in the minimum tax calculations.
21. See, for example, Feldstein and Summers (1979), Fullerton et al. (1981), and
Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks-Mireaux (1983).223 The Tax System
Households' purchases of bonds, however, account for only part of
their ultimate ownership of debt-financed corporate investment. They
also make deposits at banks, which, in turn, use those funds for loans to
corporations in the forms of mortgages, commercial paper, acceptances,
and bond purchases. If all of these corporate interest payments flowed
through the intermediaries to households in a taxable form, then we
could just add bank holdings of corporate debt to the household sector
and tax it all at the 0.325 combined household rate on interest receipts.
Since individuals in 1980 received no interest on demand deposits (check-
ing accounts) and sometimes received low interest rates on time deposits,
we could imagine three alternative treatments of the taxation of interest
payments made by companies to banks. The first alternative represents a
strict adherence to the general procedures of chapter 2, intended for use
by all four countries. The second alternative follows the spirit of those
procedures but accounts for interest ceilings on time deposits, found
primarily in the United States. The third alternative follows a different
view taken by Feldstein and Summers (1979).
Bank assets such as corporate debt are not tied to particular liabilities
such as time deposits or demand deposits. As a result, all three alterna-
tives employ information on total time and demand deposits for a break-
down of bank holdings of corporate debt. In the first alternative, time
deposits are a conduit through which all corporate returns are paid out in
the form of interest that is fully taxable at the household level. This
procedure ignores the differential between the rate earned on corporate
loans and the rate paid to depositors. Demand deposits, on the other
hand, are a conduit through which all corporate returns are used by the
bank not to pay interest, but to provide services to depositors. House-
holds receive liquidity in the form of check writing and other banking
services, but they are not taxed on this form of return to their investment.
We thus assign a zero tax rate to the return on the share of households'
corporate debt held through demand deposits, and a 0.325 rate to all
other holdings of corporate debt.
For specific estimates, we use statistics on the ownership of corporate
debt from table 6.18 of the next section. Of the $528.7 billion held by
households in 1980, $285.6 billion was in commercial banks and $83.6
billion in savings institutions. Essentially all of the last category repre-
sents time deposits, taxed at the household rate. For commercial banks,
Flow of Funds data reveal that their $1,306.2 billion total liabilities
included $306.4 billion (or 23.5 percent) in demand deposits, $462.0
billion (or 35.4 percent) in small savings and time deposits, and the rest
(or 41.1 percent) in other large accounts with no ceilings. We apply these
percentages to the bank holdings of corporate debt. Following the first
alternative, the overall household rate is calculated as 0.325, the tax rate
on interest, times the proportion of debt not in demand deposits:224 The United States
(6.9) m. 325[528.7-(.235)(285.6)1284 V
 } [ 528.7 J
The second alternative recognizes that regulatory ceilings affect the
interest paid by both commercial banks and savings institutions. Each
maturity has a separately assigned ceiling, but the average rate paid on
savings and small-denomination time deposits was 7.88 percent in 1980.
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Since the unconstrained money market rates were about 12 percent in
1980, there existed a considerable interest differential that was ignored by
the first alternative. In the spirit of the first alternative, however, we can
treat these small savings deposits as generating nontaxable services for
depositors. They might not receive check-writing services, but there are
few withdrawal constraints, and the banks provide other liquidity ser-
vices. In this view the interest differential does not generate pure profits
for the bank, because competition for customers would encourage banks
to extend their hours, open more branches, or provide gifts for new
depositors. Since demand deposits and the interest differential on savings
deposits represent nontaxable returns to households, the figures above








22. In 1980, the maximum interest rates payable on time and savings deposits at
federally insured institutions were:
Type of Deposit
Savings
90 days to 1 year
1 to 2.5 years
2.5 to 4 years
4 to 6 years
6 to 8 years
8 years or more


































The ceiling on six-month money market time deposits was the auction average from most
recently issued six-month United States Treasury bills. This rate varied throughout the year
but reached 15 percent in December 1980. The ceiling for 2.5 year deposits was fifty basis
points below the 2.5 year Treasury rate. This long-term rate varied around 11 percent during
the year, substantially less than the short-term rate just mentioned. These regulations were
in a state of transition, owing to the March enactment of the Depository Institution
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. This new law imposes more consistent
reserve requirements, broadens the powers of savings institutions to invest in corporate
securities and to offer checking services, and orders a phaseout and ultimate elimination of
interest rate ceilings. The authorities to impose ceilings on deposits by any of the federal
financial institutions regulatory agencies are repealed as of 31 March 1986.225 The Tax System
where 184.6 = 83.6 + (.354)(285.6) is the part of households'corporate
debt held in savings accounts, and 277.2 = 528.7 - [184.6 + (.235)
(285.6)] is the part not in savings or checking accounts.
The third alternative corresponds to the procedures used in Feldstein
and Summers (1979). They argue that corporate interest receipts of the
bank, when not paid out to depositors, are taxed as equity income to the
bank's shareholders. In other words, banks earn monopoly profits that
are not competed away either in the form of interest or in the form of
additional services. The assumption of monopoly profits is left unex-
plained. For the combined rate of tax on banking income, Feldstein and
Summers used an estimate of 0.561, reflecting the statutory corporate tax
rate plus additional personal taxes on dividends paid to bank share-
holders. With this estimate, the total tax on household and bank receipts












In this equation the household rate is applied to the interest actually
paid on time deposits, and to direct ownership, while the bank's share-
holders' rate is applied to the retained interest differential on time
deposits plus all interest earned on funds in demand deposits.
The different approaches may be further explained as follows. A
marginal tax rate measures the increased tax associated with a marginal
dollar of income. However, interest income iK can increase either be-
cause of an increase in the interest rate / or because of increased invest-
ment in assets K. In this study we are concerned with a marginal increase
in corporate capital K, financed in the same proportions as existing net
capital. With this assumption, a proportion of additional savings is de-
posited in banks that use the funds for loans to corporations. Some of the
ensuing interest must be used to pay interest on the additional time
deposits (with a 0.325 tax rate on household interest receipts), some must
be used to service the additional time and demand deposits (with a zero
tax rate), and some might be retained as monopoly profits to the owners
of the banks (with a 0.561 corporate tax rate).
Feldstein and Summers, however, were concerned with a different
margin. They measured the additional tax associated with increases in
inflation and resulting increases in the nominal interest rate. Without any
additional dollar deposited, there is no need for the bank to incur costs
through services on the extra deposit. Furthermore, interest-rate ceilings
prevented banks from paying higher interest themselves. As a result of226 The United States
the monopoly power assumption, all of the extra interest represents
additional income to the banks and is taxed at the banks' corporate rate.
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Finally, this study is concerned with the total tax wedge on a nonfinan-
cial corporate investment. While monopoly profits of the bank might be
part of the wedge between the gross return on the nonflnancial invest-
ment and the net return of the ultimate saver, it is not clear that any of this
monopoly wedge should be counted in our tax wedge. Any tax on these
profits could be described as a tax on the financial activity rather than on
the nonflnancial corporate investment.
Still, all three views have something to recommend them. We will take
the central estimate of 0.284 as our household tax rate on interest income
in the standard case. The lower rate of 0.245 will be used with an
alternative "low tax" set of parameters, and the 0.383 rate will be used
with an alternative "high tax" set of parameters.
6.2.9 Tax-Exempt Institutions
A deduction from personal tax is allowed for all employer and em-
ployee contributions to "qualified" retirement accounts, including
Keogh and IRA accounts. A qualified pension must be nondiscrimina-
tory and must meet certain other legal requirements for tax-exempt
status. Not more than 20 percent of an employee's gross earnings may be
placed in such an account and deducted from taxable income. The
earnings of these pension reserves are also untaxed, but all retirement
income is taxed when paid out. If the individual's marginal tax rate is
unchanged after retirement, then this treatment is equivalent to that of a
consumption tax. Thus the appropriate personal rate on this form of
saving is zero.
Contributions to nonqualified pension plans, on the other hand, are
not deductible in determining taxable income. The earnings on these
nonqualified pension funds are untaxed until retirement benefits are
paid, however, so these earnings have the advantage of tax deferral. One
could think of the deferred personal income tax as an element in the
taxation of nonqualified pension reserves. This treatment would require a
23. The two margins for effective marginal tax rates have different implications for
behavior. To determine desired investment, individuals presumably want to know the extra
tax associated with the marginal investment. Corporations receive investment tax credits
and accelerated depreciation at historical cost on this marginal investment, and banks must
pay the going rate of interest on the marginal deposit. By contrast, the extra tax associated
with a marginal change in the interest rate does not involve any new credits or depreciation,
or any new deposits. Bank interest might not increase, because of the ceilings. However, it is
not clear that individuals can do anything about the extra tax associated with a marginal
change in the inflation rate and the interest rate. Rather, if the inflation rate changes,
individuals want to know the new extra tax associated with the marginal investment,
including the ITC, accelerated depreciation at historical cost, and taxes on the interest of the
new deposit.227 The Tax System
present value calculation for retirement taxes, including a figure for the
average time between pension earnings and pension benefits. A long
postponement of tax and a high discount rate would imply a low effective
tax on these pension earnings. Furthermore, the relative size of these
nonqualified pensions is extremely small. Feldstein and Summers (1979)
use zero for the effective personal rate on all pension income, and we
make the same assumption here.
Nonprofit institutions also pay no tax on interest or dividend receipts.
The m and z parameters for these groups are zero. Unfortunately, the
Flow of Funds data include nonprofit institutions in the household sector.
Sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 discuss ways of moving nonprofit institutions
from the household category to the tax-exempt category.
6.2.10 Insurance Companies
Households receive investment income indirectly through insurance
companies, and this income is taxed through a complicated set of provi-
sions. In order to make sense of these provisions, this section breaks them
down into corporate taxes on life insurance companies, corporate taxes
on nonlife insurance companies, and personal taxes on amounts paid out
by insurance companies. The particularly complicated, and seemingly
arbitrary, taxation of life insurance companies is explained below by
describing it in historical context.
First consider only the personal taxes on individual saving through life
insurance. Individuals use after-tax income to pay insurance premiums,
but no personal tax is due on accruals of interest to the reserves or on
benefits paid on the death of the insured. If there were no corporate tax,
then this treatment would correspond to the prepayment plan of a con-
sumption tax.
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4 If benefits are taken before the death of the insured, there
is the possibility of a personal tax liability on earnings of the account—
that is, benefits in excess of paid-in premiums. In this case insurance
savings get the same deferral advantage as the nonqualified pension
discussed in section 6.2.9. As mentioned there, a long postponement of
tax, high discount rate, and/or a low personal rate after retirement can
justify ignoring this personal tax as well.
For these reasons, we set the personal tax on insurance saving at zero.
Insurance companies do, however, pay a corporate income tax. Consider
the taxation of dividends and capital gains, followed by the taxation of
interest income.
Since 85 percent of intercorporate dividends are excludable, the effec-
tive tax on insurance company dividend receipts is 0.15 x 0.46, or 6.9
24. See Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1977) for
thorough descriptions of prepayment plans and qualified accounts.228 The United States
percent.
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5 On realized capital gains, insurance companies pay the corpo-
rate statutory rate of 28 percent. We assume that insurance companies
expect to realize 10 percent of their gains each year, and we use equation
(6.8) above to calculate the effective rate on accrued capital gains. This
rate depends on the discount rate and thus on the insurance company's
marginal tax rate. However, when the EAT ratio of equation (6.8) is




For interest income, insurance companies other than life insurance
companies basically are taxed like other corporations. Feldstein and
Summers (1979) take this to mean that these companies pay the 0.46
corporate rate on all interest income, and that their stockholders pay
dividend taxes if the income is distributed or capital gains taxes if it is
retained. Feldstein and Summers use 0.561 as the combined corporate
and personal tax on insurance company income. Again, however, this
procedure assumes that the extra capital income is generated by an
unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate. The relevant margin
for our purposes is an increase in capital assets. The extra tax then
depends on how the (nonlife) insurance company obtained the additional
assets.
In our international comparison of marginal tax rates, we take a 1
percent increase in the existing capital stock, used wherever capital is
currently used and owned wherever capital is currently owned. In gen-
eral, individuals proportionately increase their holdings through all con-
duits, including direct ownership, banks, pensions, and insurance com-
panies. Since insurance companies are a category of ownership, we posit
an increase in their capital assets. If they make such investments out of
their net earnings, without any additional reserves or expenses to deduct,
then a tax of 0.561 might well be paid on the resulting income. However,
the personal tax (associated with the difference between 0.561 and 0.46)
would have to be paid on those earnings in any case. The only extra tax
associated with this additional investment is the 0.46 corporate rate. If,
instead, we explain the additional assets by suggesting an overall increase
in the insurance business, then insurance companies would finance in-
vestments out of premiums but would incur additional reserves and
expenses. They might pay no additional tax if there are no excess profits
on their new operations. In light of all these considerations, the simplest
25. Note that here we use the 0.46 federal corporate tax rate rather than the 0.495
combined corporate tax rate. State and local governments typically impose premium taxes
(on the consumer's purchase of life insurance services) rather than income taxes (on the
investment income of the life insurance corporation).
26. For individuals, we cut the statutory capital gains rate of 0.28 in half to account for
the increase of basis at death. We used the resulting 0.14 rate in (6.8) to get effective rates of
about 7 percent. Since insurance companies do not have that advantage, their 0.28 statutory
rate is used directly in (6.8) to get effective rates of about 14 percent.229 The Tax System
and probably most appropriate marginal tax rate for nonlife insurance
interest income is the 0.46 corporate rate. This rate is used with our
standard parameters for the small portion of corporate debt held by
nonlife insurance companies. The lower rate of zero will be used with our
alternative "low tax" set of parameters, and the 0.561 rate will be used
with our "high tax" set of parameters.
The taxation of life insurance companies is more complicated because
of two special factors that exist only for life insurance companies or that
become particularly acute only for them.
2
7 First, annual accounting would
provide a particularly bad measure of life insurance income. While the
income and expenses of most businesses are fairly close to concurrent,
the life insurance transaction earns premiums many years before it is
terminated. At the same time, long-run profitability of the insurance
transaction can be accurately predicted by using mortality tables, and
reserves can be set aside for those future death benefits. For these
reasons, reserves are counted as a liability, income on the reserves is
counted as a required expense for those future benefits, and annual tax
calculations can use income on required reserves as a current deduction.
Without legally specified allowances for reserves, however, life insurance
companies could greatly affect their own taxable income through their
choice of mortality and interest assumptions.
Second, the taxation of life insurance companies is complicated by the
perceived need for maintaining the competitive balance between stock
and mutual companies. The measured income of a stock company might
be taxed at corporate rates before distribution of net earnings to share-
holders, but the mutual company has no owners other than the policy-
holders who mutually insure each others' lives. Mutual companies would
receive an unfair advantage if they were allowed to describe distributions
as premium reductions and thus avoid corporate taxes.
The history of life insurance taxation reflects various attempts to
embrace these special factors. From the beginning of the corporate tax
until 1920, life insurance companies were subject to ordinary principles of
taxation. That is, they included premiums and investment income, and
they deducted operating expenses, sums paid out on insurance contracts,
and net additions to policy reserves. Reserves were self-determined, and
dividends were deductible if applied to current premiums. Capital gains
were made nontaxable in 1921, and reserve interest requirements were
limited to a uniform 4 percent rate. The company's actual interest re-
quirements were not considered, but the 4 percent allowance changed
several times since 1921. Mutual and stock companies were made compa-
rable by eliminating the deduction for policyholder dividends.
27. The following discussion derives largely from the thorough treatment of the taxation
of life insurance companies provided by McGill (1967). For more recent discussion, see
Aaron (1982, 1983).230 The United States
After 1942 the Treasury determined the excludable portion of invest-
ment income for each company, the "secretary's ratio," based on a
weighted average of the company's actual interest requirements and an
assumed interest rate of 3.25 percent. At various times when actual
interest rates fell, the secretary's ratio exceeded one, and no taxes were
paid by life insurance companies. The fixed 3.25 percent rate was
dropped in 1949 so that reserve allowances could reflect the low actual
rates then in effect. Reserve allowances were dropped altogether in 1951,
but the statutory rate was reduced such that taxes would be the same as if
the previous rates had applied with a secretary's ratio of 87.5 percent for
all companies.
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act, passed in 1959, re-
verted to a modified version of the total income approach used before
1921. The major features of this act are still in effect. Premiums, invest-
ment income, and capital gains are all includable, while expenses, div-
idends to policyholders, and special reserve allowances are all deductible.
Dividends to shareholders are not deductible. The company's tax is
calculated in four "phases," but we assume that the firm is taxed under
phase I. (Phase II taxes part of the underwriting gains, phase III taxes
distributions not already taxed under phase II, and phase IV separates
capital gains so that their tax is not offset by operating losses.)
Phase I calculates the investment yield as the difference between gross
investment income and deductions for expenses, state and local taxes,
depreciation, and depletion. Call this investment yield iK, the product of
an interest rate and assets owned by the life insurance company. Reserve
interest requirements are determined for each company in a formula with
several steps. First, the "adjusted reserve rate" {an) is found as the lesser
of the company's current rate of return (/) and the average rate of return
for the past five years. Next, the "average reserve interest rate" for all
companies is derived from various assumptions. This average rate
assumption has remained close to 0.03 and has not changed in response to
inflation. Finally, the "adjusted life insurance reserves" are calculated by
assuming that each percentage point by which the company's adjusted
reserve rate {an) exceeds the average interest rate (0.03) implies a 10
percent reduction in required reserves. If actual reserves are denoted R,
then adjusted reserves are R[l — 10{an — .03)]. This formula is often
called the "ten-to-one rule," or the "Menge formula" after its instigator.
The company can deduct the adjusted reserve rate on these adjusted
reserves.
(6.12) Taxable income = iK - {an)R[l - 10{an - .03)].
Thus, if our margin is an increase in K with no change in actual reserves,
the interest rate /, or the adjusted rate an, then the additional capital
income is taxed at the 0.46 corporate rate, and that is the end of it. As in231 The Tax System
the case of nonlife insurance, we could use 0.46 as the extra tax, assuming
that the additional assets were financed out of net earnings (and that any
additional personal tax would have had to be paid on those earnings in
any case). Or again, as in the case of nonlife insurance, we can explain the
additional assets by suggesting an overall increase in the life insurance
business. The life insurance company finances investments out of pre-
miums but incurs additional expenses in obtaining and servicing the
additional policies. It must hire more salesmen, clerks, and investment
analysts, and it might pay no additional tax if there are no excess profits
on its new operations. Thus a tax rate of zero will again be used with our
"low tax" set of parameters.
Suppose instead that all assets are held only for reserves, including the
marginal increase in K. Suppose also that the adjusted reserve rate equals
the actual interest rate. Since R = K and arr - /, equation (6.12) can be
multiplied by 0.46 and simplified.
(6.13) Tax = 4.6(/ - .03)iK.
This simpler formula is used by Feldstein and Summers (1979) and others
to compute life insurance taxes. When those authors calculate the extra
tax for a change in /, they differentiate (6.13) with respect to i and obtain
4.6(2/ - .03) as the extra tax on K. They use / = 0.07 to get a tax rate of
50.6 percent, but at the 1980 interest rates of approximately 0.12, this tax
rate would be 96.6 percent.
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The problem, of course, is that regulatory authorities have not changed
the 0.03 average reserve rate in response to inflation and higher interest
rates. The increase in / serves to increase both the taxable income iK and
the effective tax rate 4.6(/ - .03).
Our margin, however, concerns not an increase in the interest rate /,
but an increase in the capital stock K. From (6.13), the tax rate on interest
income iK is equal to 4.6(/ - .03). With/ = 0.07 this rate is 18.4 percent,
and with / = 0.12 this rate is still only 41.4 percent. For 1980 interest rates
and actual inflation rates, we could just use this tax of 41.4 percent.
Another problem arises, however, when we calculate effective tax rates
under assumptions of different inflation rates: How would inflation affect
the nominal yield?
Suppose first that i = r + TT/(1 - m) such that real after-tax returns are
constant by assumption. Where r is fixed at 0.05, our model assumes that
nominal interest rises by the increase in inflation rate divided by unity
minus the average personal tax rate over debt and equity (0.3559). In this
case, the 4.6(/ - .03) tax rate becomes (.092 + 7.14-rr), equal to 0.092
with no inflation, 0.5755 with the actual United States inflation, and
28. This description of Feldstein and Summers (1979) is only slightly different from their
actual procedures, because they used the then-current corporate rate of 0.48, and took the
difference between the tax at i = .07 and the tax at / = .08, rather than differentiating.232 The United States
0.8062 with 10 percent inflation. The tax rate skyrockets because inflation
adds more than point-for-point to the nominal interest rate within the
effective tax rate formula. These rates will be used with our "high tax" set
of parameters.
On the other hand, we might not believe that counterfactual scenario.
In particular, the fixed 3 percent allowance is not consistent with a ceteris
paribus change in TT. With 10 percent inflation and 20 percent nominal
interest rates, insurance companies would successfully lobby for a change
in the law or at least a change in the fixed 3 percent allowance. Fur-
thermore, Summers (1982) finds that actual interest rates hardly rise with
inflation, if they rise at all. Our assumption of constant after-tax returns
requires that inflation adds more than point for point to interest rates, but
Summers finds evidence that a point-for-point relation is a high upper
bound. Indeed, r = 0.05, IT = 0.0677, and / = r + IT provides a 0.1177
nominal interest rate, very close to the 12 percent figure mentioned above
for 1980. In this case, the 4.6(7 - .03) tax rate becomes (.092 + 4.6-JT),
equal to 0.092 with no inflation, 0.403 with actual inflation, and 0.552




Insurance companies have recognized that their taxes rise with infla-
tion. Partly in response to this effect, insurance companies have discov-
ered and increased their use of tax loopholes such as "modified coinsur-
ance." Under this arrangement, the life insurance company can reinsure
its policies with another company while retaining the assets associated
with those policies. Money changes hands in complicated ways, but the
funds left with the original insurer are not called investment income. As a
result, they are taxed at a lower rate. Table 6.12 shows recent revenues
from life insurance companies in the last column. These revenues are
generally increasing through the early 1970s but increase faster in the late
1970s with inflation. After 1979, when modified coinsurance was dis-
covered, revenues suddenly fall.
Finally, the pension fund business of life insurance companies is not
29. We do not use the 0.46 rate that results from the assumption that life insurance
companies invest out of net earnings with no change in actual reserves. Instead, the authors
of all four country chapters agreed to assume that the additional investment comes from
individuals saving through new life insurance policies. This assumption implies that the tax
is zero if expenses exhaust the income from the new policies, or that it is from equation
(6.13) if we ignore expenses other than the allowance for adjusted reserves. Still, however,
the 0.46 rate might be justified from the 4.6(/ - .03) formula if all assets are held for reserves
and if the interest rate is a fixed 13 percent at any inflation rate. The use of a 0.46 tax rate on
interest income would also be more compatible with the rates on dividends and capital gains
discussed above. All forms of investment income enter the "yield," and the Menge formula
determines the assumed split between the company and the policy holders. The fraction
attributable to the company is multiplied by total dividends, and the company can exclude
only 85 percent of its resulting share of total dividends. Thus the tax on dividends should



































































































Source: Flow of Funds and Life Insurance Fact Book.
taxable. Table 6.12 shows not only the very rapid growth of private
pension reserves in the first column, but also the rising pension reserves
of life insurance companies in the second column. These pension reserves
made up 22 percent of total life insurance reserves in 1965, 25 percent in
1970, 31 percent in 1975, and 44 percent in 1980. These assets of pension
funds administered by life insurance companies are included in the tax-
exempt category when we look at holdings of each group in section 6.3.5.
The final step is the averaging of the tax rate for life insurance with the
tax rate for other insurance. As shown in section 6.3.5, all insurance
companies hold $133.1 billion of corporate debt that is not attributable to
pensions. Life insurance companies hold 84.4 percent of this total, and
other insurance companies hold the remaining 15.6 percent. Table 6.13
summarizes our tax rate findings for all our ownership categories. For
insurance companies, we use a weighted average of life insurance and
other insurance companies found in the two preceding rows. The "low
tax" parameter for both types of insurance is a zero rate, so the average is
a zero rate. The "standard" tax rate for life insurance is (.092 + 4.6ir)
and for other insurance is 0.46, so the weighted average is (.149 +
3.88IT). The "high tax" rate for life insurance is (.092 + .714ir) and for





















































Source: Derived and described in the text.
Finally, note that the tax rate for exempt institutions is always zero and
that the tax rate for households has standard, low, and high alternatives
given by equations (6.9), (6.10), and (6.11), respectively. All of these tax
rates are listed in table 6.13.
6.3 The Structure of the Capital Stock and Its Ownership
6.3.1 Data Limitations
With the statutory tax parameters of section 6.2, we can calculate
effective tax rates for each of the eighty-one combinations involving three
assets, three industries, three sources of finance, and three ownership
categories. Then, with the proportion of capital stock attributable to each
of the eighty-one combinations, we can calculate various types of
weighted averages. This section derives the weights for averaging these
effective marginal rates. Section 6.3.2 describes a three-by-three matrix
for the amount of each asset used in each industry. These nine numbers
derive from Jorgenson's more detailed capital stock data that were used
in sections 6.2.3, 6.2.4, and 6.2.5 to average depreciation and investment
grants over thirty-four assets for each of our three industries. Section
6.3.3 describes another three-by-three matrix for the sources of finance
used in each industry. While Flow of Funds data do not provide an
industry breakdown of retained earnings, new equity, and new debt
issues, we use data on the market value of debt and equity in each
industry to derive these nine separate numbers.
Section 6.3.4 describes the ownership of corporate equity, and section
6.3.5 describes the ownership of corporate debt. A number of studies
discuss the corporate shares, dividends, capital gains, and interest income235 The Structure of the Capital Stock and Its Ownership
of institutions and households in different income brackets, but none
traces that ownership through to the industry or asset of origin.
3
0 Indeed,
such a study for the United States would face enormous difficulties
dealing with the ownership of conglomerate corporations and with inter-
corporate shareholdings. (The chapter for Germany describes a study of
the ownership of financial claims by industry, made possible by the lesser
degree of conglomeration.) In any case, when we take the three own-
ership proportions for debt in the United States and apply the three
equity ownership proportions to both retained earnings and new equity
issues, we have another three-by-three matrix of ownership for each
source of finance. Finally, the three matrixes can be appropriately multi-
plied together to produce eighty-one proportions. In doing so, we assume
that all assets in a particular industry are financed in the same way, that all
owners hold debt from the different industries in the same proportions,
and that all owners hold equity from the different industries in the same
proportions.
6.3.2 Capital Stock Weights
The most thorough and detailed capital stock data available for the
United States are those described in Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) and
Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980).
3
1 Their basic procedure starts with gross
investment in the 1963 and 1967 "capital flows tables" from the Survey of
Current Business. Though these matrixes are not available on an annual
basis, the Commerce Department does provide enough information to
construct a vector of investment by industry and a vector of investment by
asset for each year. These vectors can be taken as row sums and column
sums of underlying annual capital flow tables. For every year back to
1929, they take the 1963 gross investment matrix and scale each row so
that its total equals the investment for that industry in that year. They
then scale each column so that its total equals the investment for that
asset in that year, and they iterate between row and column scaling until
they have an investment matrix for that year that is consistent with the
30. See, for example, the 1962 Survey of Consumer Finances, done for the Federal
Reserve Board by Projector and Weiss, and the 1974 Survey of Current Business study of
stockownership trends, done by Blume, Crockett, and Friend.
31. Alternative published capital stock data are available in Kendrick (1976). He in-
cludes much detail on industry, government, and personal wealth, but corporate capital is
not segregated, and 1973 is the most recent year. Since machinery, buildings, and invento-
ries make up the only three assets considered in this study, we effectively ignore investments
in land, investments in R&D, and investments in goodwill through advertising. Since
manufacturing, other industry, and commerce make up the only three industries considered
in this study as described in chapter 2, we effectively ignore all investments in agriculture,
mining, crude petroleum, financial business, real estate, and government enterprises. Trade
and services fall into the commercial category, while construction, transportation, com-
munications, and utilities are aggregated into other industry.236 The United States
two investment vectors. This procedure of iterative row and column
scaling is described in Bacharach (1971).
From this procedure they obtain gross investment for each asset in each
industry back to 1929. They then use Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates
for each of the thirty-four assets, found in table 6.5, to calculate a capital
stock matrix by the perpetual inventory method. For each asset-industry
cell, they add gross investment from each year and subtract depreciation
in each year up through 1977 to get net capital stock in that year. These
capital stock data are particularly well suited for our purposes not only
because of the great asset and industry detail, but also because they are
designed to be consistent with Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates used
elsewhere in this study.
3
2
The 1977 capital stock matrix, aggregated to our assets and industries,
is shown in table 6.14. The total corporate capital in these categories
(excluding land) is $1,702 billion, as shown in the fourth row of the table.
Of this total, $746 billion or 44 percent is in manufacturing, $530 billion or
31 percent is in other industry, and $426 billion or 25 percent is in
commerce. Of the capital in manufacturing, most is in buildings, but a
surprisingly high proportion is held in the form of inventories. Since other
industry includes utilities, the predominant share of capital is in build-
ings, followed by machinery. Our commercial category includes retail
and wholesale trade, so the predominant share of capital is in buildings,
followed by inventories. The proportion of capital in each of these nine
cells is shown in parentheses in the table, and we assume that these
proportions were the same in 1980 as in 1977.
6.3.3 Sources of Financial Capital
Data from the Flow of Funds are used in table 6.15 to estimate the
proportions of corporate investment financed through retained earnings,
new equity, and debt. The sector is defined as "nonfinancial corporate
business," which would include not only manufacturing, but other indus-
try and commerce as well. This data source does not disaggregate by
industry. The first column gives gross internal funds on a national income
accounting basis for 1970 to 1979. This definition corresponds to a mea-
sure of cash flow in the corporate sector, not a measure of economic
profits.
The second column of table 6.15 provides net new equity issues for
1970-79. The third column shows the net increase in liabilities from debt
instruments, including corporate bonds, mortgages, acceptances, com-
mercial paper, finance company loans, United States government loans,
bank loans not elsewhere classified, and tax-exempt bonds. The propor-
tions at the bottom of table 6.15 are remarkably similar to those for the
32. The land and inventory figures were obtained somewhat differently by Dale Jorgen-




























































Source: Aggregation from unpublished data described in Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981)







































































































Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Sector Statements of Savings and Investment.238 The United States
other countries in this study. In the United States, 60 percent of corporate
investments are financed by internal funds, 35 percent by debt, and only
4.8 percent by new share issues.
Because "internal funds" in this table is just a measure of cash flow, it
takes no account of the fact that inflation reduces the real value of
outstanding debt. In table 6.15, the sum of "internal funds" and "new
equity issues" understates equity finance by the amount of this inflation-
induced gain to equity holders. However, while inflation affects the
validity of the debt-equity breakdown in table 6.15, it does not affect the
validity of the relation between retained earnings and new share issues.
Thus we use table 6.15 for the equity breakdown, but we obtain debt/
equity ratios elsewhere.
An industry breakdown for debt and equity is available with data from
the COMPUSTAT tape of the Standard and Poor's Corporation. This data
tape contains balance sheet information on 2,484 publicly traded cor-
porations, including firms with securities traded on the New York Stock
Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and over the counter. This
tape was used by Gordon and Malkiel (1981) to estimate the economy-
wide ratio of the market value of debt to the market value of debt plus
equity. Since the information on each corporation also includes its pri-
mary industry of operation, we can reproduce the Gordon and Malkiel
procedures to get a similar ratio for each of our three sectors. For each
corporation on the tape, we first determine the industry with which it is
associated. Most of these disaggregated industries fall into one of our
three sectors, while firms in agriculture, mining, finance, or real estate
are excluded. We are left with 1,201 firms in manufacturing, 298 in our
"other industry" category, and 395 in commercial enterprises. Only the
book value of debt is reported on the COMPUSTAT tape. For each firm on
the tape, we construct a figure for the market value of debt by using its
disaggregated industry's average ratio of market value of debt to book
value of debt, available in von Furstenberg, Malkiel, and Watson (1980).
When the ratio of the market value of debt to the book value of debt was
not available for a specific industry, we applied the economywide ratio to
the firms in that industry.
The resulting debt/capital ratios are 0.1981 for manufacturing, 0.4847
for other industry, and 0.3995 for commercial enterprises. The high
proportion for debt in other industry reflects the high proportion of
public utilities in that sector. The remaining fractions in each industry,
attributable to equity, can now be divided into new shares and retained
earnings by using the average division found in table 6.15. For all indus-
tries combined, the ratio of new shares to total equity is 0.0738. Applying
this fraction to the remaining equity/capital ratio for each of our three
industrial sectors, we obtain the three-by-three matrix in table 6.16 for



























Source: Derived and described in the text.
6.3.4 The Ownership of Equity
Proportions for equity ownership are obtained from Flow of Funds
data. Neither this source nor any other source can be used to determine
the industrial mix of each owner's debt or of each owner's equity.
The household sector in the Flow of Funds includes both individuals
and nonprofit institutions such as hospitals and universities. Since we
want these institutions to be grouped with the tax-exempt category, we
must impute a division to the data. For this purpose we follow Feldstein
and Summers (1979) and Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks-Mireaux (1983)
in assuming that 7 percent of household equity is held by nonprofit
institutions. This percentage, applied to all years, is the figure estimated
for 1975 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (1977). The result-
ing individual holdings are shown in the first line under households in
table 6.17, and the resulting nonprofit holdings are shown in the last row
under tax exempt. Tax-exempt ownership also includes private pensions
and state and local government retirement funds that are fully funded
pensions.
Insurance company equity must also be divided into the part attribut-
able to the companies' insurance business and the part attributable to
their pension business. The latter holdings must also be moved into tax
exempt. Table 6.12 showed that pension reserves made up 22 percent of
total life insurance reserves in 1965, 25 percent in 1970, and 44 percent in
1980. These proportions are applied to 1960, 1970, and 1980 life insur-
ance holdings of equity to obtain their pension holdings, shown in the
second row under tax-exempt holdings.
Table 6.17 shows that the proportion of equity held by our household
category has declined from 86.8 percent in 1960, to 81.5 percent in 1970,
and to 74.3 percent in 1980. It is still higher than the corresponding 43.5
percent figure for Britain or the 60.4 percent figure for Sweden, but it is
comparable to the several industry-specific figures for Germany.
Inspection of annual data in the Flow of Funds reveals that the decline
across time in the United States was nearly monotonic, but that most of it
took place in the first half of the past decade. The household proportion
was already down to 74 percent by 1975. Bank and insurance company240 The United States
Table 6.17 Ownership of Corporate Equity in
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Source: Flow of Funds Accounts: Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, various issues.
holdings have increased slightly over the two decades, but they remain
inconsequential. The big increase since 1960 is to be found in various
pension plans, including private plans, those operated through insurance
companies, and the funded pension plans of state and local governments.
These and other ownership trends are further discussed in Blume, Crock-
ett, and Friend (1974). The final equity ownership proportions, those
from 1980, are 0.743 for households, 0.215 for tax-exempt institutions,
and 0.041 for insurance companies.
6.3.5 The Ownership of Debt
Nonfinancial corporate borrowing can also be obtained from the Flow
of Funds data, but the lenders in each case cannot be traced directly. We
will trace these owners of corporate debt indirectly by first looking at all
the forms of corporate net liabilities and then looking at financial assets in
the portfolios of each ownership category. This procedure essentially
replicates for 1960,1970, and 1980 the procedures used by Feldstein and
Summers (1979) for 1976 alone.
For each year, we have data on the financial assets and liabilities of
nonfinancial corporate business. Debt instrument assets include demand241 The Structure of the Capital Stock and Its Ownership
deposits, time deposits, security repurchase agreements (RPs), govern-
ment securities, commercial paper, consumer credit, net trade credit, and
miscellaneous assets. Debt instrument liabilities include bonds, mort-
gages, bank loans, more commercial paper, bankers' acceptances,
finance company loans, United States government loans, and miscel-
laneous liabilities. If all these amounts were listed vertically with assets
included negatively, the column would sum to net corporate indebted-
ness. In this study, however, we exclude government securities, govern-
ment loans, and net trade credits. Then, for each item in this column, we
construct a row that determines its distribution among creditors or debt-
ors. For example, each ownership category has a table in the Flow of
Funds that shows its holdings of corporate and foreign bonds but does not
show its holdings of United States nonfinancial corporate bonds sepa-
rately. We assume that the latter are distributed among owners in the
same proportions as the former.
Similarly, we assume that United States nonfinancial corporate mort-
gage liabilities are distributed among owners in the same proportions as
total holdings of mortgages shown in the tables. Bonds and mortgages are
the only two forms in which pensions and life insurance companies hold
any corporate debt. Next, nonfinancial corporate liabilities in the form of
bank loans or bankers' acceptances are allocated entirely to commercial
banks, and those in the form of finance company loans are allocated
entirely to finance companies.
Similar assumptions are made about corporate assets. Demand de-
posits and security RPs are allocated to commercial banks, while time
deposits are split between commercial banks and savings institutions in
proportion to their total liabilities in that form. Net assets in the form of
commercial paper are allocated entirely to finance companies because
these are the largest single issuers of open-market paper. Consumer
credit is allocated entirely to households. The result is a matrix for the
distributional ownership of each corporate asset (listed negatively) or
liability. The sum of each column gives the net corporate liabilities in the
hands of each owner. As in the case of equity, however, the part of life
insurance holdings that are attributable to pension business are moved to
the tax-exempt category.
The resulting ownership of corporate debt is shown in table 6.18 for
1960, for 1970, and for 1980. Unlike equity, the trend seems to be an
increasing proportion of debt held in the household sector. Most of this
debt is attributable to banks and finance companies. Holdings of tax-
exempt institutions are diminishing slightly over time, but most of the
decline is found in the proportional holdings of insurance companies. The
proportion of total corporate debt held for the pension business of life
insurance companies is actually increasing.
A comparison of debt and equity and in tables 6.17 and 6.18 demon-242 The United States
Table 6.18 Ownership of Nonfinancial Corporate Net Debt
in 1960, 1970, and 1980
($ billion in current prices; proportions in parentheses)
1. Households



















































































Source: Flow of Funds Accounts: Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, various issues.
Note: Net debt equals (bonds + mortgages + bank loans + commercial paper issued +
bankers' acceptances + finance company loans) minus (demand deposits + time deposits
+ security repurchase agreements + consumer credit + commercial paper owned).
strates the portfolio effects of differential tax treatments. Individuals in
1980 own the smallest part of debt (8.1 percent) and the largest part of
equity (71.2 percent). However, banks and other household interme-
diaries hold 52.8 percent of debt and 3.1 percent of equity. Finally,
insurance companies own a larger share of debt (15.3 percent) than of
equity (4.1 percent). These patterns are not surprising in light of com-
parative tax advantages.
Also, as in the case of equity, Flow of Funds data do not separate the
debt held by nonprofit institutions from the debt held by taxable indi-
viduals. This aggregation causes less of a problem here in that individual
plus nonprofit debt holdings are miniscule compared with their equity
holdings. But it causes more of a problem in that no estimates are
available for the breakdown of this debt. As in the case of equity, we
could assume that 7 percent of this debt is held by nonprofit institutions,
but portfolio responses to taxation suggest that much more of the equity243 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
would be held by individuals and much more of the debt would be held by
nonprofits. Since the numbers in the case of debt are small, we proceed by
using two sets of parameters. The standard set of parameters come
directly from table 6.18 and are shown in the top half of table 6.19. We
use the 1980 proportions of 0.609 for households, 0.237 for tax-exempt
institutions, and 0.153 for insurance company holdings of corporate debt
in all industries.
The "low tax" set of parameters are obtained from table 6.18 by
assuming that all of the debt holdings of individuals and nonprofit insti-
tutions are actually in the hands of the nonprofit institutions. These
parameters, as shown in the bottom half of table 6.19, are 0.529 for
households, 0.318 for tax-exempt institutions, and 0.153 for insurance
companies.
6.4 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
6.4.1 Principal Results
With the fixed-/? calculations described in the methodology chapter,
our standard assumptions about tax parameters, and the actual inflation
rate of 6.77 percent, the overall weighted average of the marginal effec-
tive tax rate on capital income in the United States is 37 percent. The
interpretation is that if all assets started with a gross return of 10 percent,
and if all capital of all owners were increased by one dollar, then the
present value of the expected tax would be 37 percent of the additional
return. It is noteworthy that this effective rate is less than the 46 percent
statutory corporate tax rate, but the effective rate incorporates many
factors that tend to offset or increase overall taxes. Some of these factors
are discussed as we look at the breakdown of this effective tax rate in
table 6.20.
The numbers in this table are calculated such that the overall rate of 37
percent is obtained by taking a weighted average of rates over the three






























Source: Derived and described in the text.244 The United States
































































assets, or over the three industries, or over the three sources of finance,
or over the three owners. A glance down any column of this table reveals
considerable dispersion among these combinations, however, and this
dispersion increases with the rate of inflation. This first column shows
rates for zero inflation that vary from -2 to +61 percent, while the
second column shows rates for 10 percent inflation that vary from - 37 to
+105 percent. (Because we use the same capital stock weights for differ-
ent inflation rates, we abstract from the possibility that patterns of
investment might shift in response to a change in the rate of inflation.)
The distribution of 1980 tax rates is further discussed in chapter 7.
The bottom row of this table shows that overall taxes increase some-
what with inflation, from 32 percent at zero inflation, to 37 percent with
6.77 percent inflation, and to just over 38 percent with 10 percent infla-
tion. This very moderate rise with inflation may be surprising to those
who are accustomed to thinking about depreciation at historical cost,
FIFO inventory accounting, and the taxation of purely nominal capital
gains. Feldstein and Summers (1979) found that these factors combined
to increase taxes significantly with inflation. They found no offsetting
effect through the deductibility of nominal interest payments, because
the tax rate at which individuals included interest receipts (42%) was as245 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
high on average as the rate at which corporations deducted interest
payments (40.4%).
Here, by contrast, we find that the combined federal and state corpo-
rate rate for nominal interest deductions is 49.5 percent. For nominal
interest receipts, when we use weights for debt in table 6.18 to average
the owners' marginal tax rates in table 6.13, we obtain an overall rate of
23.6 percent. Our procedures improve on earlier ones by using more
recent data, by treating some of the return from banks as tax-free ser-
vices, by moving the pension business of insurance companies into the
tax-exempt category, and by looking at a marginal increase in capital
rather than in the interest rate. (These differences are further explored in
Fullerton 1983.) Thus corporations can deduct nominal interest at a 49.5
percent rate, significantly higher than the 23.6 rate at which recipients
must include it, and the row for debt in table 6.20 shows a subsidy that
increases with inflation. This effect offsets some of the other effects of
inflation. In table 6.20, we also assume that all firms use the tax-




We do, however, include the effect of inflation on the nominal allow-
ances for depreciation. This effect is pronounced for machinery, where
the effective rate changes from 4 percent at no inflation to 18 percent at
6.77 percent inflation and 23 percent at 10 percent inflation. The tax on
buildings increases slightly with inflation, as shown in the table, but the
tax on inventories falls from 51 percent with no inflation to 45.5 percent
with 10 percent inflation. This asset receives no depreciation allowances,
so the disadvantage of historical cost depreciation does not offset the
advantages of nominal interest deductions.
The effective tax rate includes the taxation of purely nominal capital
gains, but at the reduced statutory rate applicable to capital gains. The
row for retained earnings in table 6.20 shows a rate that increases from 48
33. As an alternative, we recalculate effective tax rates with the assumption that the
proportion of inventories on FIFO is v = 0.7, the actual fraction for manufacturing
inventories in 1979 as discussed in section 6.2.3. Fixed-/? results are summarized in the
accompanying table.
Overall Effective Tax Rate













Clearly, with no inflation, the choice for inventory accounting is irrelevant. Also, as can be
seen from the detailed results, the choice has no effect on machinery or buildings. It has a
large influence on inventories, however, producing the overall effect shown here. FIFO
accounting adds six percentage points to the effective tax rate at 6.77 percent inflation, and
almost nine percentage points at 10 percent inflation.246 The United States
to 67 percent with inflation. More important, we include the effect of
inflation on the taxation of insurance companies. As described in section
6.2.10, we find that their interest income is taxed at a rate equal to (.149
+ 3.88TT), where IT is the rate of inflation. Because the allowance for
reserves is based on a fixed nominal interest rate, inflation tends to
increase insurance companies' effective rate of tax as well as their nomi-
nal taxable income. The effect is dramatically demonstrated in the row
for insurance companies in table 6.20, where the overall tax increases
from 4 percent to 44 percent as inflation changes from zero to 10 percent.
The rates in table 6.20 include state corporate income taxes, state and
local property taxes, complicated nonlinear depreciation schedules, and
an asset-specific investment tax credit. As described in section 6.2.6, state
and local property tax rates are lower on machinery and inventories than
on buildings. Furthermore, as described in section 6.2.5, the investment
tax credit is available only for machinery and for public utility structures.
Table 6.20 shows effective tax rates that are substantially lower for
machinery than for other assets, and substantially lower for "other indus-
try" (including public utilities) than for manufacturing or commerce.
Table 6.21 shows results for the fixed-r calculations described in the
methodology chapter. If the real interest rate with no inflation were 5
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rate, if the expected rate of inflation were 6.77 percent, and if all capital of
all owners were increased by one dollar, then the present value of the
expected tax would be 50 percent of the additional return. As explained
in chapter 2, averaged effective tax rates are higher than in the fixed-/?
case, but the same essential patterns exist. Overall rates are still slightly
increasing with inflation, debt is still subsidized at rates that grow with
inflation, insurance company taxes still increase dramatically with infla-
tion, machinery is still taxed at rates lower than buildings, and other
industry is still taxed at rates lower than our manufacturing or commer-
cial sectors.
At several points in the derivation of parameter values, we described
alternative arguments in favor of different procedures. Rather than claim
that any single treatment is the only appropriate one, we often decided to
select "standard" parameters as best estimates and to present high and
low alternatives to that treatment. In the taxation of banks in section
6.2.8, for example, we reviewed one argument that depositors receive
tax-free services in lieu of interest and another argument that bank
owners pay a corporate rate of tax on the interest differential. The
various arguments gave us 0.245 for the "low" tax rate on the household
sector's interest income, 0.284 as the standard rate, and 0.383 as an
alternative high rate.
For insurance companies, the "low" tax rate is zero, the standard rate
is (.149 + 3.88-rr), and the "high" rate is (.165 + 6.03ir). These alterna-
tives are reviewed in table 6.13 above. Finally, the standard parameters
use 0.609 and 0.237 for the proportions of debt held by households and
tax-exempt institutions, respectively, allocating all of the individuals plus
nonprofit category to households. As an alternative, the "low" tax pa-
rameters allocate all of these holdings to nonprofit institutions and use
0.529 and 0.318 for the same parameters.
Table 6.22 shows our fixed-/? results with the "low tax" assumptions.
Relative to the standard parameters, for the actual inflation rate, the
overall fixed-/? tax rate falls from 37 percent to 32 percent. Thus the net
result is fairly robust to these assumptions. (In the fixed-r case, not
shown, the overall tax falls from 50 percent to 47 percent with the use of
low tax parameters.) Some interesting differences exist, however, as the
overall rate is no longer monotonically increasing with inflation. Since the
proportion of debt held by tax-exempt institutions has increased, and
since individuals are taxed on nominal interest at a lower rate, inflation
provides more of a subsidy through the deducibility of nominal interest
payments at the corporate level. Because the effects of historical cost
depreciation diminish as inflation increases, and since the effects of
nominal interest deductions do not diminish, the latter eventually over-
take the former, and the effective tax rate turns down at some inflation
rate. That point is reached earlier with the low tax parameters than with248 The United States
Table 6.22 Effective Marginal Tax Rates, United States, 1980,





























































the standard parameters, but the effective tax rate still turns down if
inflation becomes high enough.
3
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Table 6.23 shows our results with the "high tax" assumptions. In this
case, the overall fixed-/? tax rate is 41 percent. In light of these results, we
can be fairly sure that the correct tax rate (given the methodology and our
whole approach to the problem) is between 32 percent and 41 percent,
with a best estimate of 37 percent. (In the fixed-r case, not shown, this
rate falls between 47 and 52 percent, with a best estimate of 50 percent.)
Household nominal interest is taxed at a 0.383 rate in the high tax case,
much closer to the corporate rate at which nominal interest is deducted.
Thus, table 6.23 shows that the average debt financed asset is no longer
subsidized. More important, insurance companies are assumed to get
reserve allowances at only a 3 percent nominal rate even as their actual
nominal interest rate increases by more than the rate of inflation. Table
6.23 shows an effective rate for this ownership category that increases
34. Figure 7.1 of the next chapter shows tax rates for inflation rates up to 15 percent. The
curve for the United States rises before leveling off. The curve for Germany, which has
similar depreciation allowances and interest deducibility, rises and then falls.249 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates






































































Returning to the standard parameter tax rates, we next attempt to
determine the relative contributions of different tax instruments. That is,
we decompose the effective tax rates of table 6.20 by calculating alterna-
tive tax rates that would exist were it not for property taxes, or corporate
taxes, or personal taxes. To see how much of the 37 percent effective rate
is due to the state and local property tax, table 6.24 reports fixed-p results
for a simulation with no such tax. The overall tax rate falls from 37
percent to 31 percent, so the property tax contributes an average of six
points to the overall effective rate. The property tax is deductible from
the corporate income tax, however, so a calculation with a property tax
and no other taxes would show an effective tax rate of more than 6
percent. By comparing table 6.24 with table 6.20, we can see that the
35. The reader might also notice that effective tax rates in some categories are raised by
the use of "low tax" parameters or reduced by the use of "high tax" parameters. In
particular, the effective tax rate on retained earnings is 67 percent with the low-tax
assumptions, 62 percent with the standard assumptions, and only 58 percent with the
high-tax assumptions. Because this phenomenon is general to all four countries, it is fully
explained in chapter 7 (pp. 289-90).250 The United States
Table 6.24 Effective Marginal Tax
































































deductible property tax adds 7.3 percent to the tax on buildings, 5.9
percent to the tax on machinery, and 4.1 percent to the tax on inven-
tories.
Table 6.25 reports fixed-/? results of a simulation with no corporate tax.
Depreciation allowances are irrelevant, and for consistency we have also
set the investment tax credit rates to zero. This case is different from full
integration of the corporate and personal tax systems in that it does not
attempt to measure corporate income for personal tax purposes. Rather,
personal tax applies just to interest paid, dividends paid, and realized
capital gains. Under these assumptions, t falls from 37 percent to 35
percent. Again, this difference is affected by the deductibility of the
property tax: a calculation with corporate taxes and no other taxes would
show an effective rate larger than 2 percent. Still, however, it is clear that
the investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation allowances, and the
deductibility of interest payments and property taxes have all served to
greatly diminish the incremental impact of the corporate tax system.
Although t falls for buildings and inventories with the elimination of the
corporate tax, the combination of credits and accelerated depreciation
implies that the effective tax on machinery would rise were it not for the
corporate tax. Similarly, as shown in the table, debt would no longer be
subsidized.251 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Finally, table 6.26 portrays a world with corporate taxes and property
taxes, but with no personal tax on any of our ownership categories.
3
6 Both
m and z are set to zero so that no owners are taxed on interest receipts,
dividend receipts, or capital gains. Now the effective tax rate is 7.7
percent as shown in table 6.26, almost thirty points lower than before.
While interrelations (such as the deductibility of property taxes at the
corporate level) destroy the additivity of our decomposition, it is clear
that the personal tax system contributes the bulk of effective taxes in the
United States. Without the personal tax, machinery would be subsidized,
other industry would be subsidized, the subsidy for debt would increase
from 16 to 73 percent, and the average rate on households would fall from
58 to 13 percent.
3
7
6.4.2 Recent Changes in Tax Legislation
The Economy Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) represented a major
departure from recent tax history. It specified a 23 percent reduction in
personal tax rates, phased in over a period of three years, and it intro-
duced the first indexation of marginal rate brackets in the graduated
personal income tax system, scheduled to start in 1985. It introduced
tax-free "all savers' certificates" for individuals, charitable deductions for
those who do not otherwise itemize their deductions, and a reduction in
the marriage penalty mentioned in section 6.2.1.
3
8 For businesses, ERTA
entirely removed the complex set of depreciable lifetimes for various
assets and replaced them with only four categories of lives. It expanded
the investment tax credit, extended the period for carryover of losses,
introduced tax credits for new research and development, changed the
tax rates in low corporate brackets, and created a "safe harbor" for a
36. Since insurance company taxes are actually part of the corporate tax system, we
might have eliminated them along with the corporate tax rather than with the personal tax.
However, these simulations are intended to provide intuition rather than evaluation of real
policy proposals.
37. This decomposition was performed for both the fixed-p and the fixed-r methods,
with the following summary results:
Fixed-/? Case Fixed-r Case
Overall Overall
Effective Effective
Tax Rate Decrease Tax Rate Decrease
With all tax instruments
With no property taxes
With no corporate tax or ITC















38. Starting in 1983, joint filers are able to deduct 10 percent of the earnings of the
lower-earning spouse, up to a maximum of $3,000. With a top marginal rate of 50 percent,
the maximum tax saving is $1,500. If two individuals with similar incomes were to marry,
however, they would still pay a higher total tax than they did under the single schedules.252 The United States
Table 6.25 Effective Marginal Tax Rates, United States,






























































leasing arrangement designed primarily to extend the benefits of credits
and accelerated depreciation deductions to firms without enough tax
liability to take advantage of them otherwise. Here we look at the
ultimate version of the 1981 law, scheduled to start in 1986, where
machinery receives five-year services lives and is depreciated at the
double declining balance rate. Detailed provisions of the 1981 law are
described in sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.5.
Several of these business tax provisions will not be evaluated here.
First, changes to the tax rates in low corporate brackets do not affect the
use of 0.46 as the top marginal rate. Second, the extension of the period
for loss carryovers and the introduction of safe-harbor leasing pertain
only to companies with insufficient tax liability to use all their deductions.
In this study we abstract from actual practices and concentrate on a
hypothetical project undertaken by a taxable firm that exhibits tax-
minimizing behavior in this regard. Finally, business tax changes such as
the new R&D credit do not relate primarily to income from capital.
A personal tax change that does relate to the taxation of income from
capital is the phased reduction of personal marginal rates. While the top
marginal rate falls from 70 percent to 50 percent immediately, all other
rates are reduced by 23 percent over three years. The important issue for253 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
our purposes is to estimate the weighted-average personal marginal tax
rate on interest income at the end of this transition. This rate was 0.325
for individuals in 1980, and it would fall to 0.325(1 - 0.23) = 0.250 by
1985 if there were no inflation. Because indexation does not start until
1985, however, inflation will push many individuals into higher nominal
brackets with higher marginal rates. What rate of inflation from 1980 to
1985 would be enough to completely negate the effects of the 23 percent
cut? A lengthy footnote finds that the required inflation rate would be




Other personal tax provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act are
ignored. The new all savers' certificates provide tax-free interest, but at
rates 30 percent below the corresponding taxable government bond rate.
Finally, changes to the marriage penalty and to charitable deductions do
not relate primarily to income from capital.
Effective tax rates under the ultimate 1981 law, presented in table 6.27,
can be compared with rates under the old law in table 6.20. With these
legal developments, the overall rate in the fixed-p case falls from 37
percent to 26 percent, with actual inflation. The rate is still only mod-
erately related to inflation, while debt is still highly subsidized. Under the
1981 law every category of industry, owner, or source of finance has a tax
rate that is lower than under the 1980 law, at any inflation rate. Every
category of asset has a tax rate no higher than before, but inventories are
taxed exactly the same way, since they receive no investment tax credit
and no depreciation allowances.
39. If nominal incomes were unchanged when all marginal rates were cut by 23 percent,
then revenue and average rates would also fall by 23 percent. The same holds for a tax
schedule of the form
T=.CY
a,
where T is total tax collected, Y is nominal taxable income, a is the elasticity of T with
respect to Y, and C is an arbitrary constant. The TAXSIM model of NBER has been used to
estimate that a is 1.66 in the United States. Because BT/dY is equal to aTlY, the marginal
rate is always 166 percent of the average rate. Thus when ERTA first cuts the marginal rate
from 0.325 to 0.250, the average rate falls from 0.196 to 0.151. Revenues initially fall from
CYo
a to (1 - .23)C%
a. Suppose, however, that inflation at rate i\ for five years increases
nominal incomes and prices by the factor e
5jT. Nominal tax revenue after five years would
then be .llC(Yoe^)
a. Dividing by the price index e
5ir, we find that real revenue after five
years is .11 CY{)'
Xe
5'"^ ~ ' \ We want to find the value TT such that the increase in real revenues
is equal to 23 percent of the prechange revenue:
^
Ux~ " - .77CV = .23CYo
a.
Dividing both sides by .11CY{" and substituting for a, we have
e.^(.66)_ j = _23/.77,
and -IT is equal to 7.92 percent. If the time period were six years, IT would only have to be 6.60
percent. Finally, because the marginal rate equals a 777 and real income is unchanged by
assumption, the restoration of real revenue also restores the marginal rate.254 The United States
Table 6.26 Effective Marginal Tax Rates, United States,





























































If the phased increases in depreciation were continued to 1986,
machinery would become subsidized on an overall average basis. This 5.5
percent subsidy results from the combination of investment tax credits,
very short depreciable lives, and the use of double declining balance.
Autos, for example, receive a 6 percent credit and a three-year life. With
double declining balance and the half-year convention, as described in
section 6.2.3, the investor could write off 33 percent of the asset in the
year of purchase, and an additional 45 percent in the first full year of
ownership. The net result is a subsidy at the corporate level alone, a
subsidy that is augmented if the ultimate owner is a tax-exempt institution
or if debt is used to finance the investment. The overall 5.5 percent
subsidy for machinery in table 6.27 includes the average amount of
personal taxes on interest or dividend receipts.
Buildings are taxed at an overall 30 percent rate, while inventories
have not changed from their 47 percent rate under the 1980 law. As
pointed out by Fullerton and Henderson (1981), the Economic Recovery
Tax Act implies significantly disparate tax treatments of depreciable
assets on the one hand, and of land and inventories on the other. For
actual inflation in the fixed-/? case, effective tax rates change from a
dispersion of - 21 to + 91 percent in 1980 to a dispersion of - 38 to + 85
percent under ERTA.255 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Table 6.27 Effective Marginal Tax Rates, United States, with the





























































The fixed-r case is not shown, but the overall tax falls from 50 percent
to 41 percent under the 1981 law, when expected inflation is equal to the
actual rate of 6.11 percent. As in the fixed-/? case, the taxation of inven-
tories is unchanged, while other rates are all lower than before. Debt and
tax-exempt institutions would be subsidized more than before, and
machinery would become subsidized at a 17 percent rate. Variations
among the rates are again greater under ERTA than they were in 1980.
These calculations pertain to the ultimate version of the 1981 law, not
scheduled to start until 1986. Equipment actually received the new five-
year lives and 150 percent of declining balance in 1981, but Congress
never allowed the phased changes to 175 and 200 percent of declining
balance. In the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the 150
percent declining balance rate was made permanent for equipment, and
the depreciation basis was reduced by half the investment tax credit.
Section 6.2.3 described these provisions in more detail. The 1982 law also
changed safe-harbor leasing and excise taxes, but these provisions do not
affect our calculations.
The resulting overall fixed-/? effective tax rate, which fell from 37
percent to 26 percent with the ultimate 1981 law, now rises back to 31.5
percent. Table 6.28 shows the breakdown of fixed-/? effective tax rates by
asset and other combinations. For machinery, the tax rate fell from 17.6256 The United States
Table 6.28 Effective Marginal Tax Rates, United States, with the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act





























































to — 5.5 percent under the ultimate 1981 law but rises back to 11 percent
under the 1982 law. Inventories are unchanged at 47 percent. Most
buildings are unaffected by the 1982 law, but public utility structures were
grouped with equipment for phased changes that were cut off by the 1982
law. Thus table 6.28 also shows a rate for buildings that rises from 30 to 33
percent, and a rate for "other industry" (including utilities) that rises
from 0.7 to 11.4 percent. Sources of finance and owners show somewhat
higher tax rates as a result of these changes for equipment and public
utility structures.
In the fixed-r case, not shown, the overall effective tax rate fell from 50
to 41 percent but now rises back to 45 percent. The rate for machinery fell
from 26 to -17 percent but now rises back to 19 percent. Although the
weighted-average fixed-r tax rates are higher than the fixed-/? tax rates,
patterns among combinations are very similar. In either case the 1982
changes for equipment reverse about half of the overall tax cut associated
with the 1981 law.
Finally, we note a surprising and dramatic result of these changes in
corporate taxation. With personal and property tax rates unchanged, the
overall fixed-/? effective tax rate falls from 37 percent in 1980 to 31.5257 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
percent in 1982. Yet table 6.25 shows that these personal and property
taxes alone yield an overall effective rate of 35 percent. Thus, while
elimination of the corporate tax under 1980 law would subtract two
percentage points, repeal of the corporate tax after 1982 would raise the
overall effective tax rate from 31.5 percent to 35 percent. Taxes will still
be collected on the income from old investments, but the combination of
new grants, accelerated depreciation, and interest deductions more than
offsets any corporate tax on the marginal investment. If firms can make
use of these tax benefits, then the corporate system amounts to a net
subsidy to marginal investments after 1982.
6.4.3 Comparison with 1960 and 1970
Although histories of the personal and corporate income taxes were
provided in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, particular parameter values for use
in calculating 1960 and 1970 effective tax rates were not specified. By
referring back to those sections, and particularly to a few tables, we can
now specify the tax parameters that were different in those years. In
order to compare only the tax systems in the three periods, however, we
do not recalculate capital stock weights or inflation rates in earlier years.
Rather, we try to determine the effect of 1960 law were it to exist in 1980.
Since 1938, the United States corporate income tax system has been a
classical (nonintegrated) system in the terminology of chapter 2, so the 0
parameter is unity in all years. Table 6.4 shows some historical variation
in the federal statutory tax rate on all corporate profits, however, includ-
ing a 0.52 rate for 1960 and a 0.48 rate for 1970. In addition we need to
adjust for state corporate taxes, as in section 6.2.2, where the 1980
federal rate of 0.46 was augmented by (1 — .46)(.O655) to account for the
weighted-average state marginal rate of 0.0655 and the deductibility of
state corporate taxes at the federal level. We cannot calculate the
weighted-average state corporate tax rates for 1960 and 1970 the same
way we did for 1980, but we adjust the 1980 rate by factors that reflect the
growth of state corporate taxes. In particular, data in Feldstein, Poterba,
and Dicks-Mireaux (1983) show that the 1979 ratio of the marginal
federal corporate rate to the average federal corporate rate (.46/.317) was
1.22 times the ratio of the marginal state corporate rate to the average
state corporate rate (.0655/.055). If the same relationship existed in
earlier years, then the 1960 and 1970 state marginal rates would have
been 0.0245 and 0.0460, respectively. The total 1960 statutory rate is then
[.52 + (1 - .52)(.O245)] = 0.532, and the total 1970 rate is [.48 + (1 -
.48)(.O46)] = 0.504. Thus the total rate fell from 53.2 to 49.5 percent
from 1960 to 1980, even though the state rate rose from 2.45 to 6.55
percent.
Starting in 1954, all assets were depreciated by the double declining
balance method with a switch to sum-of-the-years' digits, but since 1969258 The United States
buildings have been depreciated by the 150 percent of declining balance
method with a switch to straight-line. These methods and the tax-
minimizing choices of firms are described in section 6.2.3. While Jorgen-
son and Sullivan (1981) found that firms have moved only gradually
toward the more accelerated methods, we wish to look at changes in tax
law rather than changes in actual practice. For this reason we assume that
firms choose the most advantageous depreciation schedules in all years,
and these are given by equations (6.1) through (6.6) above.
Tax law has been amended to allow shorter lifetimes, however. Table
6.29 is similar to table 6.5 in that it lists the same twenty types of
Table 6.29 Tax Lifetimes by Asset Class in 1960 and 1970
Asset Class
1. Furniture and fixtures
2. Fabricated metal products




7. Mining and oilfield machinery
8. Metalworking machinery
9. Special industry machinery
10. General industrial equipment
11. Office and computing machinery
12. Service industry machinery
13. Electrical equipment
14. Trucks, buses, and trailers
15. Autos
16. Aircraft









26. Other nonfarm buildings
27. Railroads
28. Telephone and telegraph
29. Electric light and power
30. Gas
31. Other public utilities
32. Farm structures
33. Mining shafts, and wells











































































Source: Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).259 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
equipment and the same fourteen types of structures. Bulletin F lifetimes,
in the first column, were in effect for these assets from 1942 until 1962,
when the "Guideline" lifetimes of the second column were introduced.
The Guideline lifetimes (for 1970) are all 30 to 40 percent less than the
Bulletin F lifetimes (for 1960). Then, in 1971, the Asset Depreciation
Range (ADR) system established Guideline lives as the midpoints for an
allowed 20 percent increase or decrease in depreciation periods for
equipment (assets 1-20) and public utility structures (assets 27-31). For
1980, we therefore use 80 percent of ADR midpoints as the shortest
allowable lives for those assets, as shown in column 3 of table 6.5.
As mentioned in section 6.2.5, the investment tax credit was first
introduced in 1962 and was repealed from 1969 to 1971. Thus the rate of
grant was zero for all assets in both 1960 and 1970. The corporate rates,
grant rates, and other parameter changes are summarized in table 6.30.
In section 6.2.6, the effective property tax rates for buildings and for
other assets are found to be 0.01126 and 0.00768, respectively. These
rates are estimated for 1977 and applied to 1980. We cannot, however,
calculate separate property tax rates for 1960 and 1970 in the same
manner as for 1977. As with the state corporate tax rates, we adjust the
1977 property tax rates by factors that reflect changes in state and local
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Asset lifetimes, L
Property tax rates, wc
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Source: Derivations described in the text.260 The United States
property taxation. Data in Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks-Mireaux (1983)
show that the overall property tax rate in 1960 was very close to the
overall rate in 1977, and that the overall rate in 1970 was 1.25 times the
rate in 1977. We therefore use 1980 rates for 1960 and scale them by 1.25
to obtain rates for 1970. Final property tax rates are shown in table 6.30.
For the weighted-average marginal tax rate on dividends in 1980, we
use 0.475 as found by the TAXSIM model of NBER. Since that source is not
available for earlier years, we turn to rates estimated by Brinner and
Brooks (1981). The total federal and state tax rates on personal dividend
receipts in 1960 and 1970 were 0.431 and 0.413, respectively. Tax-exempt
institutions pay no tax on dividend receipts, while insurance companies,
like other corporations, can deduct 85 percent of dividend receipts. Since
the federal corporate tax rates were 0.52 in 1960,0.48 in 1970, and 0.46 in
1980, their effective tax rates on dividends in those years were 0.078,
0.072, and 0.069, respectively.
We use 0.28 for the weighted-average statutory personal marginal tax
rate on realized capital gains in 1980, a number found by the TAXSIM
model. This time, however, we have no viable alternative source for
earlier years. Although the Revenue Act of 1978 reduced the taxable
proportion of long-term gains from 50 to 40 percent (and thereby set the
top federal rate at 28 percent), prior law specified a maximum 25 percent
rate on the first $50,000 of gains and an additional 10 percent tax on the
excluded gains in some circumstances. Since we halve the 0.28 rate to
account for the increase of basis at death, and since the resulting 0.14 rate
is approximately halved again to account for deferral, the resulting rate is
small, and variations over time would be small. For these reasons we use
the TAXSIM personal rates in all years. Exempt institutions pay no tax on
capital gains, while insurance companies paid the statutory corporate rate
of 30 percent in 1960 and 1970, reduced by the Revenue Act of 1978 to 28
percent for 1980.
Finally, we turn to the tax on interest income. The TAXSIM model
provides an estimate of 0.325 for the combined federal and state marginal
personal rate in 1980, and again we have no viable alternative source for
earlier years. There have been many adjustments to personal rates and
brackets over the years, including a 1964 reduction in the top marginal
rate from 90 to 70 percent, but most of these adjustments have only
approximately offset the fact that inflation pushes individuals with un-
changed real income into higher nominal brackets with higher marginal
rates. Wright (1969) found that the average personal marginal tax rate on
interest income in 1958 was 33.3 percent, very close to our number for
1980. As a result, we use the same personal rate for all years. When
adjusted for interest receipts of banks, this figure is 0.284, as shown in
table 6.30. Since the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 is
still in effect, the tax rates for our third ownership category are also
unchanged.261 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates

































































When all of these 1960 parameters are substituted into the basic United
States data to calculate effective tax rates using our standard methodol-
ogy, the results are as shown in table 6.31. The overall fixed-/? rate is 44.9
percent with no inflation, and 48.4 percent with 6.77 percent inflation.
While the relation between inflation and the tax rate is not linear, it is
clear that the tax rate in 1960 would be about 46 or 47 percent if very low
rates of inflation were expected at that time. This rate falls in 1980 to 37
percent with 7 percent inflation, or 38 percent with 10 percent inflation.
Many have suggested that accelerated depreciation and shorter lifetimes
have been introduced in response to higher expectations of inflation, but
these results indicate that legal changes have much more than offset any
increases in inflationary expectations.
4"
Moreover, the bottom row of table 6.31 shows that the overall rate in
1960 is fairly insensitive to expected inflation and even falls as inflation
increases from 7 to 10 percent. This result can be explained by the much
40. Since the pattern of investment responds to tax differentials, the weights would
adjust over time. The rate on machinery fell the most, so investment would increase the
most. Because we use the relatively high 1980 weight for machinery in all years, the high
average rates from earlier years are somewhat overstated. Also, these calculations assume
that firms minimize taxes by using LIFO inventory accounting. Footnote 33 summarizes
some results with 70 percent FIFO accounting, and the tax rates in that case rise faster with
inflation.262 The United States
longer asset lifetimes in 1960, since depreciation deductions are less
important. The fact that depreciation is on a historical cost basis when
there is inflation cannot make real depreciation deductions much lower,
while the fact that nominal interest is deducted against the corporate tax
rate still substantially reduces the cost of debt finance. Indeed, the row
for debt finance still shows a subsidy with 7 or 10 percent inflation, even
though nominal interest receipts of individuals are included at the per-
sonal rate, and even though there are no investment tax credits or short
lifetimes allowed on the assets that are financed by that debt.
Machinery, since it receives no credits, relatively long lives, and only
historical cost depreciation, is taxed at a 59 percent effective rate in 1960.
When compared with the 18 percent rate for machinery in 1980, this
figure is striking. Table 6.29 shows that the lifetimes for some types of
equipment were as long as twenty-five to thirty years, whereas the longest
life in 1980 was fourteen years. Autos were depreciated over 11.8 years in
1960, compared with three years in 1970 and 1980. When we note that the
economic depreciation rate for autos is measured to be 33.3 percent per
year, it is clear that some assets were not receiving even economic
depreciation write-offs in 1960. Since autos and machinery made up a
relatively high proportion of total assets in commerce and manufacturing,
those industries are taxed at rates of 42 and 59 percent respectively.
The overall tax rate in the fixed-r case is 59 percent for 1960, compared
with 50 percent for 1980. As pointed out in chapter 2, the fixed-r tax rates
are always higher than the fixed-/? rates when there is a dispersion among
the rates of individual combinations. Patterns between years and among
assets in the fixed-r case are not shown, but they are similar to those in the
fixed-/? case.
The fixed-/? results for 1970 are shown in table 6.32 with an overall rate
of 47 percent. Thus, in the fixed-/? case overall effective tax rates in 1960,
1970, 1980, under the ultimate 1981 law, and under the 1982 law, are
equal to 48,47,37,26, and 32 percent, respectively. In the fixed-r case the
corresponding tax rates are 59, 57, 50, 41, and 45 percent. In either case
the total taxation of income from capital falls substantially from 1960 to
1981, but some of this decline is reversed with the 1982 law. Since the
fixed-/? rate on machinery falls from 59 to 49 percent from 1960 to 1970, it
is clear that the 1962 introduction of Guidelines did more to reduce
equipment lives than building lives (see table 6.29 lifetimes). Since the
rate on buildings rises from 45 percent to 47 percent, the elimination of
double declining balance in 1969 had more effect than the shortening of
lives in 1962. Most 1970 rates in table 6.32 are lower than the 1960 rates of
table 6.31, but inventories reflect the higher property tax rate used in the
later year.263 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates

































































6.4.4 Comparison with Average Tax Rates
How do the 37 percent (fixed-p) and the 50 percent (fixed-r) marginal
tax rates compare with other estimates of average tax rates? To maintain
comparability in such a calculation, we look at only domestic nonfinancial
corporate business, and we include all forms of capital taxation as a
fraction of all forms of capital income. We also want the income measure
to reflect economic rather than tax depreciation.
Table 6.33 summarizes the appropriation of corporate profits from
1978 to 1980. We average these years together because the series are
fairly volatile. Since losses induce delayed rather than immediate tax
offsets, the denominator of the average tax rate could be unusually low in
a single year without a corresponding reduction in the numerator. Thus
the average of several years could be expected to provide not just a more
stable but a more accurate reflection of the normal tax on existing
investments. Profits in table 6.33 are defined to include the "capital
consumption adjustment," which corrects for economic rather than tax
depreciation, and the "inventory valuation adjustment," which puts all
inventories on a LIFO accounting basis. We also include interest pay-264 The United States
Table 6.33 Corporate Profits and Their Appropriation, United States, 1978-80
($ billion in current prices)
1978-80 Average
Real operating profits 196.78
Federal and state corporate profits tax 73.10
State and local property tax 18.45
Interest payments 36.40
Dividend payments 36.90
Real retained earnings 31.93
Source: Various issues of the Survey of Current Business, plus calculations described in the
text.
merits and property tax payments in the total gross profits figure. For




Corporate profits taxes at all levels of government totaled $73.10
billion for these corporations, as shown in the Survey of Current Business.
This source also reports interest payments of $36.40 billion and dividend
payments of $36.90 billion. Real retained earnings of $31.93 billion are
obtained from their corrected profits figure less taxes, interest, and
dividends.
The property tax payments are not shown separately for these corpora-
tions, however. To obtain an estimate for these taxes, we turn back to the
effective rates estimated in section 6.2.6. The 0.01126 rate for buildings
and the 0.00768 rate for machinery and inventories were estimated from
total property taxes and total capital. When they are applied to Jorgen-
son's 1977 figures for only nonfinancial corporate structures, equipment,
and inventories, $14.54 billion results. To approximate 1979 property
taxes, we scale the 1977 amount by the ratio of the 1979 to the 1977 total
nonfinancial corporate property tax base, as shown in Feldstein, Poterba,
and Dicks-Mireaux (1983). The resulting estimate for 1979 is $18.45
billion, very close to the amount those authors find with their "equal
rate" hypothesis.
These profit taxes and property taxes are included in the taxation of
capital income, shown in table 6.34. Also in the table, we include esti-
mates of personal taxes on interest, dividends, and real retained earnings.
Interest payments from the previous table are multiplied by 0.236, the
weighted average of debt holders' personal marginal rates on interest
income. That is, the household rate of 0.284 (from table 6.13) is weighted
by their 0.609 share of debt (from table 6.19), and the insurance company
rate of (.149 + 3.88-rr) = 0.412 is weighted by their 0.153 share of debt.
41. We were unable to exclude agriculture, mining, and crude petroleum from these
calculations of the average tax rate, since the Survey of Current Business does not show
corporate interest payments or capital consumption adjustments separately by industry.265 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Table 6.34 Average Tax Rate on Real Corporate Profits
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Source: Own calculations as described in the text.
Similarly, dividend payments are multiplied by 0.356, the weighted aver-
age of equity holders' personal marginal rates on dividends. Finally, each
dollar of real retained earnings from table 6.33 is assumed to generate
one dollar of real capital gains for shareholders. The household capital
gains rate of 0.14 and the insurance company rate of 0.28 (from table
6.13) are first halved to account for deferral, then weighted by the 0.743
and 0.041 shares to obtain 0.058 as the effective rate on accrued capital
gains. This rate is applied to the real retained earnings of table 6.33 to
obtain $1.84 billion of tax, shown in table 6.34.
Total taxes are $115.11 billion, or 58.5 percent of gross corporate
profits. The gross and net rates of return are 9.4 and 3.9 percent, respec-
tively, derived by dividing gross or net profits by $2,091.0 billion, the total
1979 nonfinancial corporate stock from the Federal Reserve Board Bal-
ance Sheet data. Similar information, on average tax rates and profit
rates, is available for a time series of thirty years in Feldstein, Poterba,
and Dicks-Mireaux (1983).
Two questions arise. First, why is the 58.5 percent average tax rate
lower than the 69.4 percent rate estimated for 1979 by Feldstein, Poterba,
and Dicks-Mireaux (1983)? Second, why is the 58.5 percent average tax
rate so much higher than the 37 to 50 percent marginal tax rate?
A number of differences exist between the two average tax rate estima-
tion procedures. First, Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks-Mireaux (1983) use
0.35 for the personal rate on interest. We found from the TAXSIM model
that the total federal and state marginal rate on interest was 0.325, and we
reduced that rate to 0.284 to account for the fact that some corporate266 The United States
interest reaches the hands of bank depositors in the form of tax-free
services. Second, our calculations use weights from 1980 rather than
1976, and more recent data show more debt in the hands of tax-exempt
institutions. Third, unlike those authors, we moved part of insurance
company debt holdings into the tax-exempt group to account for their
nontaxable pension business. For these reasons, our weighted tax rate on
interest is 0.236 while theirs was 0.317. However, our 0.356 dividend rate
is similar to their 0.349 rate, and our 0.058 capital gains rate is similar to
their 0.044 rate for 1979. A final difference is that those authors include a
capital gains tax on nominal gains, the product of an inflation rate and the
capital stock. Chapter 2 describes our reasons for excluding this compo-
nent.
The differences between average tax rates and marginal tax rates
primarily involve distinctions between ex post taxes paid and ex ante
expectations of taxes using current legislation. Several such distinctions
can be suggested. First, unanticipated inflation reduces the real value of
depreciation allowances on past investments without necessarily affect-
ing the expected real value of depreciation allowances on the current
marginal investment. Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) argued that recent
inflation rates have been higher than expected in the United States and
have acted as a lump-sum tax on investments already in place. Second,
the average tax rate mixes investments with different tax treatments. The
rates from 1978 to 1980, for example, include taxes paid on some invest-
ments that were made before the 1971 liberalization of depreciation
allowances, while the marginal rate in 1980 should reflect only the law
then current. Third, transitory or windfall profits on past investments are
subject to the statutory corporate tax rate, while the expected normal
return to the marginal investment is also affected by investment tax
credits and accelerated depreciation allowances. Fourth, monopoly
profits receive the statutory rate. Fifth, initial corporate investments pay
initial low-bracket corporate rates, while marginal investments were
assumed to pay the 0.46 top bracket rate. Finally, firms may have reasons
unrelated to the marginal investment for using charitable deductions,
FIFO accounting, longer than minimum asset lives, and other features
affecting the average tax rate without necessarily affecting the marginal
tax rate.
It is thus not too surprising that when Fullerton and Henderson (1981)
took different formulations for the marginal tax rates in eighteen United
States industries, and different formulations for the average tax rates in
the same eighteen industries, they obtained correlation coefficients that
varied around zero and never exceeded 0.3. Furthermore, most of the
reasons given above point to a marginal rate that is less than the average
rate, as we found in this study. Fullerton (1983) includes much more
discussion about the difference between average and marginal effective
tax rates.267 Estimates of Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Table 6.35 Ratios of Total Capital Taxes to Total


























Source: The 1953-59 capital income, corporate taxes, and property taxes are from Rosen-
berg (1969). The imputation of personal taxes is based on assumptions of Harberger (1966),
as corrected and disaggregated by Shoven (1976). The 1972-74 ratios are from the Fuller-
ton/Shoven/Whalley model, using different personal tax imputations. See Fullerton et al.
(1978, 1981).
Several other studies have estimated average tax rates by industry,
including Rosenberg (1969) for 1953-59 and Fullerton et al. (1978,1981)
for 1972-74. Their results are summarized in table 6.35. In both of these
studies, capital income is defined to include corporate profits, net interest
paid, net rents paid, and corrections for economic depreciation. Several
years are averaged in order to avoid problems with loss carry-forwards.
Capital taxes are defined to include corporate income taxes, property
taxes, and an imputation for the personal taxes paid on capital earned in
each industry. In spite of these similarities, enough procedural differ-
ences remain so that we cannot attribute tax ratio differences to changes
over time. However, it is fair to presume that the higher rate for mining
and crude petroleum in the 1972-74 study reflects the phasing-out of oil
depletion deductions. The higher rate for the commercial industry prob-
ably reflects increased incorporation.
Because personal and property taxes are included, we can also com-
pare our corporate industries with three excluded noncorporate indus-
tries. These noncorporate industries clearly have lower average effective
tax rates. In fact, the average tax rates in both of these studies have been
used to estimate the capital misallocation and welfare effects from dif-
ferential capital taxation.
4
2 Part of the point of this book is that our
marginal effective tax rates might be better suited for measuring these
investment incentive effects.
42. See Harberger (1966), Shoven (1976), and Fullerton et al. (1978, 1981).